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A. Substantive Criminal Law
The substantive criminal law receives little attention from the
Tennessee appellate courts. No doubt this observation would be
equally true of most jurisdictions. To one who received his legal
training in a common law system of criminal law and who yet has
had some experience with Canada's federal code of criminal law, the
emphasis on criminal procedure is surprising. Does this mean that the
state codes of substantive law have reached such heights of perfection
and expertise that the efforts of the Model Penal Code draftsmen are
unnecessary or, at best, academic? It is unlikely. The position rather
reflects a preoccupation with constitutional rights and a criticism of
the present law of criminal procedure. This accentuation is not
unexpected in the light of the great activity of the United States
Supreme Court in the field of constitutional criminal procedure in
recent years.
The American law is more pragmatic than its British counterpart
and the niceties of substantive criminal law are not treated as analy-
tically in American courts.1
A few cases decided in the state in the past year have, nevertheless,
examined some substantive problems in the criminal law.
1. Involuntary Manslaughter.-In Grindstaff v. State,2 the accused
had been charged with second degree murder and was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. The defendant had been driving his auto-
mobile on the wrong side of the road and so collided head-on with a
car in which the deceased was a passenger. There was no question
of excessive speed as the defendant was travelling at less than
twenty-five miles per hour. The prosecution was not able to prove
that the accused had been drinking. (The strong smell of alcohol at
the scene of the collision was explained by beer bottles which were
smashed in the impact.) The defendant admitted that he was feeling
tense and to relieve his nervous state had taken a sedative which, he
claimed, made him drowsy.
The defendant could not deny that he had driven on the wrong
side of the road or that he was drowsy. These factors explained the
collision but did they support a conviction of involuntary man-
and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Commerce.
Professor Parker prepared the Criminal Law section of this article while Mr. Kendrick
prepared the sections on Criminal Procedure.
1. A comparison of the quantity and quality of casebooks in the United States and
England would substantiate this generalization. See also the amusing remarks of R. E.
Megarry in 1964 PRoc ENs OF TnH Ass'N OF Amd. LAW SCHOOLS, Part 2, 22-24.
2. 377 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1964).
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slaughter? The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the conviction.
Neither the trial judge's instruction to the jury nor the opinion of
White, J., shed additional light on the definition of the amorphous
crime of involuntary manslaughter. The trial judge's definition, which
was approved by the appellate court was:
Involuntary manslaughter is where it plainly appears that neither death nor
bodily harm was intended by the party killing and that death was acci-
dentally caused by some unlawful act, or by some act not strictly unlawful
in itself, but done in a reckless and unlawful manner and without due
caution, and that death was the natural or probable result of such act.
Involuntary manslaughter necessarily negatives any intent on the part of the
accused to kill another, but does not negative an intent to do an unlawful
act, or an act not unlawful in itself but done in an unlawful manner and
without due caution.3
Most of the above can be reconciled with the statutory definition of
the crime.4 Yet, involuntary manslaughter seems incapable of precise
definition. While the trial judge's reference to "reckless and unlawful'
conduct would find strong supporting authority, there are inherent
inconsistencies. The trial judge also refers to "intent to do an unlawful
act." Presumably, he is not using "intent" in its technical sense
because the code provides that manslaughter is committed "without
malice, either express or implied." Furthermore, the conventional
definition of recklessness (with its concomitant advertence, as com-
pared with the inadvertence of negligence) suggests that not only must
the conduct of the defendant fall below the standard of "due care"
but, in addition, the defendant must know that it is increasing the
risk of harm.s This entails a form of mens rea which was not present
in the instant case. Therefore, "reckless" is being used in a loose non-
technical sense which will either mean that the crime requires much
more than "ordinary" or "civil" negligence or it will qualify the
"unlawful act."
The facts of Grindstaff seem to show that the defendant's conduct
was reckless in the broad sense of the term. Judge White reviewed the
defendant's acts and found that he was "guilty of such gross, reckless,
and careless conduct as to evince a disregard for the rights of others
who were properly and lawfully upon the highway."6
3. Id. at 925-26.
4. TENN. CODE A w. § 39-2409 (1955).
5. Cf. Holmes, J., in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884), when he
defined recklessness as including "a certain state of consciousness with reference to the
consequences of one's acts." Id. at 175.
6. 377 S.W.2d at 926. See similar fact-situations with similar results in Hynum v.
State, 222 Miss. 817, 77 So. 2d 313 (1955); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super., 277, 81
A.2d 811 (1951); People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558
(1956). Cf. Maxey v. State, 64 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1953).
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This evaluation of the defendant's behavior, along with the fact
that he was driving on the wrong side of the road and, therefore,
committing the necessary unlawful act, should have been sufficient
to dispose of the case. Judge White gratuitously qualified the finding
of involuntary manslaughter based on a high degree of criminal negli-
gence bordering on a crime attracting the mens rea of recklessness.
Judge White decided that the driving of the defendant made him
guilty of an act malum in se.7 This statement is subject to three
principal objections. First, it was unnecessary because the defendant
had been engaged in an unlawful act as defined by section 39-2409 of
the Tennessee Code-so long as the additional "criminal negligence"
was proved. Secondly, the category of malum in se is likely to lead to
confusion and uncertainty; outside the commission of the common law
crimes, the decision as to what is malum in se is subject to the
unfettered discretion of subjective and moralistic judgments. Finally,
it is doubtful whether the act of the defendant in Grindstaff can be
properly categorized as malum in se.
8
On the other hand, there might be one compensating factor. Future
cases might result in convictions for involuntary manslaughter only
when the defendant's acts are truly malum in se. Such an outcome
would be greatly superior to decisions based on causation of death by
any unlawful act with little regard to the dangerousness of the act
or the recklessness or other state of mind of the accused.9
2. Self-Defense.-The Supreme Court of Tennessee also examined
the defense of self-defense. The law involved in these cases is uncom-
plicated. Clear rules were enunciated: that the question of self-
defense is one for the jury,10 and that evidence that the defendant
had threatened his victim some months previously was competent in
proving his mens rea on the occasion in question."
The defense of self-defense was denied in all three cases because the
evidence of violence by the victim was insufficient or the defendant
had retaliated with more force than was necessary. In only one case,
Douglas v. State, was the defendant's violent act fatal to the victim.
Under strict law, an unsuccessful self-defense plea should result in a
7. Citing Whitlock v. State, 187 Tenn. 522, 216 S.W.2d 22 (1948). The other
cases cited in the judgment make no mention of malum in se.
8. The court in State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905), defined an
offence malum in se as "one which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a
civilized community." Cf. State v. Reitze, 86 NJ.L. 407, 92 At. 576 (1914); Com-
monwealth v. Samson, 130 Pa. Super. 65, 196 Ad. 564 (1938); White, J., also
cited BLAcKc, LAw DicnoNnY 1112 (4th ed. 1951).
9. E.g., State v. Hupf, 48 Del. (9 Terry) 254, 101 A.2d 355 (1953).
10. Hawkins v. State, 378 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1964); Douglas v. State, 378 S.W.2d
749 (Tenn. 1964).
11. Bromley v. State, 378 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1964). Cf. Freeman v. State, 385
S.W.2d 156 (Ark. 1964).
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conviction for murder. In all three charges, the final verdict was not
murder but voluntary manslaughter (or its non-fatal equivalent)
which is in accord with the more enlightened view that excessive
self-defense should result in a criminal homicide conviction for some-
thing less than murder. This trend has received strong support in
the British Commonwealth 1 although the common law English courts
have not recognized it. Ironically, the Australian and Canadian courts
which have accepted this principle have relied on early English cases'
3
and, more specifically, American decisions.' 4
These verdicts were based on the Tennessee Code's definition of
voluntary manslaughter which is defined as a killing without malice"upon a sudden heat."15 This is in accord with the old authorities of
Hale, Hawkins, and East who would have described such a homicide
as committed upon chance medley.'6 This section has also been
used to justify a reduction of a criminal homicide where the defendant
had been provoked.
Gann v. State,17 provides an excellent illustration of "classic" self-
defense. The defendant was estranged from his common law wife,
the deceased's daughter. He visited the deceased's house and an
argument ensued. The deceased asked the defendant to leave his
premises, but the defendant refused. The deceased, who was seventy-
four years of age, armed himself with a shotgun and approached the
defendant's automobile. His wife, armed with a pistol, accompanied
him. They were fired upon by the defendant. The deceased's son
also joined the shooting affray. In a struggle which ensued, during
which the defendant was pistol-whipped by the son, the deceased was
fatally shot. Gann claimed self-defense. He was convicted of second
degree murder and the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to disturb
the verdict. The court held that an aggressor, who produces fear or
apprehension of death or great bodily harm in the mind of his adver-
sary, cannot lawfully defend his life against the deadly defensive act
of his adversary by taking the latter's life, until he has restored his
right of self-defense, lost by his initial fault, by abandoning and with-
drawing from the contest and giving notice of the fact to the
adversary.
12. E.g., R. v. McKay [19571 Vict. L. R. 560; R. v. Howe [1958] So. Austl. St. 95;
R. v. Barilla [1944] D.L.R. (B.C.) 344; R. v. Jackson, [162] R. & N. 157.
13. E.g., B. v. Rose [1884] 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 540.
14. State v. Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 834 (1922); Commonwealth v. Col-
landro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 Ad. 571 (1911). See Commonwealth v. Beverley, 237 Ky. 35,
34 S.W.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1931).
15. TENx. CODE ANN. § 39-2409 (1955).
16. 1 Hawk, (Pleas of the Crown) P.C. 83, s.24; 1 Hale P.C. 482; Foster, CGaowN
Law, 276; 1 East P.C. 280 (Amer. ed. 1806); 4 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAniXES 184, 188.
17. 383 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1964).
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On the particular facts of this case, the "castle" doctrine in addition
to the retreat rule persuaded the court that self-defense was un-
available. The court also considered, on its own initiative, the
principle in Hunt v. State, 8 where the court reduced a homicide from
second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. A recital of the
facts will show the clear distinction made by the court in Gann. In
Hunt, the defendant was met at a friend's house by the deceased and
his companions who believed the defendant had very recently attacked
the deceased's wife. The defendant voluntarily entered into mutual
combat but did not originate the fight, in which the deceased was
fatally stabbed.
In the present case, for most purposes, the position was reversed.
The defendant had initiated the fight although he no doubt argued
that it soon developed into a mutual affray. One of the strongest
points against him was the fact that he was on the deceased's territory,
if not invading the deceased's "castle" which has been granted special
sanctity in the law of self-defense. Also of prime importance in the
eyes of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was the lack of retreat by
Gann. This rule has always been strictly observed in the criminal law.
No doubt it had great significance when gentlemen fought with swords
or knives, but it appears to have little relevance in a gun fight where
the weapons have a far greater range than swords and equal potency
whether a man is at four feet or four hundred feet. Furthermore, the
crime was committed "upon a sudden heat" and the jury's interpreta-
tion of the facts seems to be arbitrary and hair-splitting.
3. Entrapment.-In Warden v. State, 9 the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee has held that the doctrine of entrapment is not recognized in
Tennessee. This state is one of two states (the other being New
York) which purportedly do not recognize entrapment as a means of
impeaching evidence or challenging a conviction.
The statement in Warden may be a little too sweeping. In that case,
three cases are cited. The first, Hyde v. State20 was decided in 1915
before the United States Supreme Court had made a pronouncement
in favor of the doctrine. Reference was made in Hyde to the "over-
whelming weight of authority" against entrapment as a defense, at
least in liquor offenses. This last qualification makes the general
statement in Warden applicable to the facts of that case, but it is
doubtful whether the defense of entrapment has been fully considered
in this state.
Thomas v. State,2 1 the second case cited in Warden, is only authority
18. 202 Tenn. 227, 303 S.W.2d 740 (1957).
19. 381 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. 1964).
20. 131 Tenn. 208, 174 S.W. 1127 (1915).
21. 182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945).
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for excluding entrapment in liquor offences. The court in Thomas
referred to "reasonable behavior" by an investigating police officer and
cited Sorrells v. United States,22 as holding that the defense is only
recognized where there is "undue inducement."
The opinion in Hyde23 held that in larceny and burglary cases, it
would not be trespass to goods where the owner of the goods or his
agent had induced or assisted the thief. Such a problem does not raise
a question of entrapment, but can be solved on basic principles of
the law of larceny and burglary. The defense of entrapment will
arise where the inducer or assistant is a law enforcement officer or
his agent or informer. This question arose in Hagemaker v. State,24 the
third case cited in Warden. The Supreme Court in the latter case
simply cited Hagemaker as supplemental authority. The case seems
to go further. Chief Justice Prewitt cited and applied a principle
of law which makes it difficult to take at face value the statement by
the Chief Justice that the doctrine of entrapment is not recognized in
Tennessee. The applicable law stated that:
One who is instigated, induced or lured by an officer of the law or other
person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission of a crime
which he had otherwise no intention of committing may avail himself of the
defense of 'entrapment' .... Such entrapment is shown where it appears
that officers of the law or their agents incited, induced, instigated, or lured
accused into committing an offense which he otherwise would not have
committed and had no intention of committing.25
The Chief Justice concluded his judgment by declaring that the
defendant had been induced by the police informer and an employee
of the owner of the goods. Therefore, the defendants were not
trespassers and could not be guilty of burglary. Although the trespass
point could be decided on the basis of the law of burglary in relation
to the employee, there seems little doubt that the court was applying
the doctrine of entrapment in Tennessee.
The least that can be said is that the doctrine of entrapment is not
recognized in Tennessee because it has never called for full considera-
tion.
26
B. Criminal Law and Corrections
1. Referral for Psychiatric Examination.-Some of the cases decided
in the past year have raised interesting problems relating to treatment
22. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
23. Supra note 20.
24. 208 Tenn. 565,347 S.W.2d 488 (1961).
25. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45 (1961).
26. Coins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1950); Palmer v. State, 187 Tenn.
527, 216 S.W.2d 25 (1948). These cases add nothing to the discussion.
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and correction of criminal offenders. In United States v. Day, 7 for
instance, the defendant had been convicted on two counts of bank
robbery and sentenced to serve, concurrently, five years and twenty
years. On a motion to vacate sentence the defendant claimed, inter
alia, that insufficient consideration had been given to his mental
condition at the time of the offence and trial. Day admitted that he
had been arrested seventy-five times for drinking. During the ten days
preceding the crime, he had been drinking heavily and taking
barbiturates.
The district court had asked the defendant whether he wished to
be referred to a mental institution for further examination. The de-
fendant had little doubt that he had problems and welcomed help,
The court sought the advice of the Chief Probation Officer as to the
advisability of sending Day to Nashville for a psychiatric examination.
In due course, the Chief Probation Officer reported back that "there
wasn't any question about Day being sane either at the time of the
robbery or at the time the investigation was made."2 The defendant
pleaded guilty and was sentenced.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consulted
authorities, both in the behavioral sciences29 and the law reports, 0
and decided that there was sufficient evidence for the court to suspect
that the accused was mentally unfit to stand trial. Therefore, the case
was remanded to the district court for further consideration.
The authorities showed that there is little doubt that excessive
and prolonged drinking can cause alcoholic dementia. The court also
cited many authorities which showed the uselessness of repeatedly
jailing drunks with no provision for treatment. The law has never
taken a constructive attitude toward the habitual drunkard. Most of
those charged with public drunkenness, disorderly conduct and
vagrancy (arising out of drunkenness) are from a low socio-economic
class and have not aroused the interest of the higher appellate courts
in matters pertaining to their constitutional rights-unless they com-
mitted serious offences similar to those committed by Day in the
present case. The medical profession has similarly failed. On many
occasions, the intake personnel of hospitals have tried unsuccessfully
to have drunks admitted to mental institutions, but meager budgets,
27. 333 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1964).
28. Id. at 567.
29. BocuE & ScHusKY, THE HoMmEss MA oN SKID Row; RAu)IziNowicz & TunNErt,
MENTAL AnNoRmALrrY AND CGIME (1964). See 25 Federal Probation, No. 2, p. 42
(June 1961); 23 Federal Probation, No. 4, p. 76 (December 1959); 22 Federal
Probation, No. 2, p. 36 (June 1955), for discussions of the present unsatisfactory
treatment of the chronic alcoholic and skid row drunk.
30. United States v. Walker, 301 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1962); Krupwick v. United
States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959).
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inadequate treatment facilities and overworked personnel are usually
unable to offer intensive treatment for the thousands of skid-row
types who obviously need help.
It might well be that the probation officer in the present case was
well aware of the inadequacies of treatment for the alcoholic and
therefore made a realistic report to the district court. Whatever the
reason for the probation officer's action, the court had relied too
heavily on a probation service which was not equipped to make a
professional report on Day. Many courts are too ready to delegate
extraordinary power to the probation officer when that court officer
is only one member of the correctional team. The probation officer is
designated as an officer of the court, but his status is ambiguous.
Similarly his report to the court, whether it is a conventional pre-
sentence report or a specialized referral as was sought in Day, becomes
part of the court record. This term is equally ambiguous. The proba-
tion officer and the reports he makes are meant to assist the court.
In most cases, the work of the probation staff is exemplary, but many
judges, through ignorance of correctional matters, the press of a heavy
docket or disinterest in post-conviction proceedings, rely too heavily
upon the probation officer.
31
The influence of the probation officer will depend entirely on his
relationship with the judge. A probation officer who over-extends him-
self is prejudicing a criminal offender in two ways: his extrajudicial
report is likely to be given too much weight and this is dangerous
if it is incompetent, biased or based on insufficient evidence. Secondly,
the subject of the report does not have the usual guarantees of
rebuttal or cross-examination because the probation officer's report is,
in many jurisdictions, privileged or at least confidential. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that to apply stringent eviden-
tiary and procedural rules to court social workers "would undermine
modem penological procedural policies that have been cautiously
adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experi-
mentation."32 That a defendant's rights can be similarly undermined
is shown by the remedy which the appellate court in Day has had
occasion to adopt.
Unfortunately, few cases receive the careful consideration accorded
the defendant in Day. The fact that he was assigned counsel is a
further reminder of the advantages of such a system.
In Anderson v. State,33 the Supreme Court of Tennessee also looked
toward treatment as opposed to retribution. The court recommended,
31. For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see Parker, Legal & Social Role
of the Probation Officer in the Sentencing Process 1964 CAN. B. REv. 621.
32. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (Black, J.,).
33. 383 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1964).
11391965]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
on the advice of psychiatrists, that the punishment of the defendant
who was convicted of first degree murder should be commuted to
life imprisonment. The court relied on medical advice that the
defendant should be transferred to a mental institution as he "would
get along in a regular psychiatric hospital environment as he was no
longer dangerous."
2. Probation Revocation.-Rodifer v. Staten also provides some
valuable insights into the relationship of corrections and law. This
case is a clear example of the less rigorous constitutional standards
which are applied to a person after his conviction. Rodifer had been
convicted of possession of intoxicating beverages.35 He was sentenced
to imprisonment for a year and a day. "Parole"36 was granted and he
was placed on probation for ten years. He violated his probation by
an alleged second liquor offense and was ordered to serve the
original sentence.
A "full, open" hearing of the violation was held and Rodifer was
represented by counsel. His main complaint on appeal was that he
had received insufficient notice to the "charge" of probation violation.
The court denied his request, holding that notice was sufficiently con-
veyed by the warrant further "charging" the defendant with possession
of intoxicating beverages.
The procedure for revoking a probation order in Tennessee had once
provided that notice had to be given to the defendant with a brief
statement of the charges against him.3 A 1961 amendment dispensed
with this notice.38 Furthermore, it is also no longer necessary for
the probation officer to obtain a warrant for the arrest of the proba-
tioner. The law was therefore clear. The defendant had "clear"
notice of the further offences he was alleged to have committed and
his counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who
provided evidence tending to show the defendant's implication in
these offences.
Of more importance in the present discussion, an earlier case39
had decided that the hearing on parole violation may be brought
without filing formal charges relating to the acts which constitute the
violation. In that case, Judge White had said that the hearing of
an alleged parole violation may be summary and that the defendant
"is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not con-
34. 379 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1964).
35. TEr. CODE ANN. § 39-2507 (1955).
36. "Parole" and "probation" are frequently used interchangeably in the reports.
In this instance "parole" signifies suspension of sentence on probation.
37. TNx. CODE ANx. § 40-2907 (1955).
38. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1961, ch. 95, § 7.
39. Finley v. State, 378 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1964).
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victed and is merely on trial upon an accusation of crime"; the judge
went on to say that on such a hearing, the court is not bound by the
rules of evidence and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is unneces-
sary.
This decision gave little or no consideration to the concept of
probation. In all fairness, Rodifer is decided in accordance with
precedent, although no court, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, has given a clear answer to the problem, mainly
because the courts have never given a clear exposition of what they
mean by probation. The concept of probation, like that of the
juvenile court, is vague because the rationale of both institutions
reflects a desire to help a person who deserves a second chance and
whose fate should not be subjected to the vagaries of legalistic rea-
soning. It is a discretionary matter. Until recently, the juvenile court
had not been overly concerned with the protection of constitutional
rights; it had relied on its equitable jurisdiction to do justice and
sometimes more than justice. It was more accessible to a non-legal
approach because the entire concept of juvenile justice operated
within the circumscribed and peculiar institution of the juvenile
court. Ironically, while the juvenile court is tending to become more
legalistic and circumscribed by demands for adherence to constitu-
tional safeguards,40 the adult courts are not examining probation in a
similar light.
If a man is given the extraordinary chance of being placed on proba-
tion so that his sentence of imprisonment is suspended, a great variety
of conditions may be imposed on him. These conditions can be
stipulations which limit his personal or work habits, his choice of
companions, his freedom to marry, to drink intoxicants or drive an
automobile. In contrast to these minor, irritating restrictions, the
defendant will have his suspended sentence enforced as the result of
his violation of probation if he commits another criminal offense. On
the one hand, the probationer may violate his probation if he disobeys
his probation officer's advice or instructions. On the other, he will have
his probation cancelled if, to take an extreme example, he commits
murder. In the first instance, of course, the probation officer will not,
in practice report the defendant for every minor infraction. At least
one hopes that he will not do so, and if he insists on so doing, that the
judge will refuse to cancel probation. The decision to report an
alleged violation of this type is totally within the discretion of the
probation officer. The trial judge will make the final decision on
40. See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoaRNL L.Q. 387
(1961); Geis, Juvenile Justice: Great Britain and California, 7 CGmsu AND DEL. 111
(1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the juvenile Offender, 41 Miusm. L. REv. 547 (1957).
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some quantum of proof less than a measure beyond a reasonable
doubt. What standard should be applied if the probation officer
reports to the court that the probationer is accused or suspected of
some crime? No one suggests that the probation officer will report a
probationer on flimsy evidence or mere suspicion. Should the violation
of probation be postponed until the probationer has been convicted of
the later crime? If his probation is cancelled prior to conviction, what
probative value has the parole violation in a subsequent trial? The
courts have never satisfactorily answered these questions for the
reasons already outlined. The highest courts are in reasonable agree-
ment that a jury trial is not necessary, 41 that the proof of violation is
less rigorous than that required for a trial42 that the rules of evidence
may be relaxed,43 that representation by counsel is not guaranteed44
and, most important, that the concept of probation is a discretionary
one and is "conferred as a privilege and cannot be demanded as a
right."45
Does this satisfactorily answer the problem? Why should the con-
stitutional rights of the probationer be discounted in these circum-
stances? This problem has not really been answered by the United
States Supreme Court although they have examined the concept of
probation on more than one occasion. Mr. Justice Hughes described
probation in Burns v. United States,46 as a "matter of favor, not of
contract." He stressed the fact that the probationer already stood
convicted and that his dereliction in violating his probation now
places him in a position where the court must decide whether the
suspension of his punishment will be revoked. He is in no position
to "strike a bargain." The Federal Probation Act authorized the
courts to suspend sentence so "that the ends of justice and the best
interests of the public, as well as the defendant will be subserved."
41. E.g., Strickland v. United States, 114 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1940); Wilson v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 228, 240 S.W.2d 774 (1951).
42. E.g., United States v. Van Riper, 99 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1938); Brill v. State, 159
Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947); Hooper v. State, 201 Tenn. 156, 297 S.W.2d 78
(1956); Gist v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 169, 267 S.W.2d 835 (1934).
43. Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937); People v. Yarter, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 292 P.2d 649 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); People v. McClean, 130 Cal. App. 2d
439, 279 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Moye v. Futch, 207 Ga. 52, 60 S.E.2d 137
(1950); Cf. Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 539, 8 S.E.2d 698 (1940); Ex parte
Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953); In re Bobowski, 313 Mich. 521, 21 N.W.2d
838; (1946); People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235, 122 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1935);
People v. Hill, 164 Misc. 370, 300 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1937); State v. Nowak, 91 Ohio
App. 401, 108 N.E.2d 377 (1952); Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314
(1945); State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 (1944).
44. People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912); Ex parte Banks, 74
Okla. Crim. 1, 122 P.2d 181 (1942) (this appears to be a minority view).
45. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
46. Id. at 220-21.
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Hughes, J., saw no indication that the court's discretion was any less
fettered when modification or revocation of probation was being
considered. The probationer is a person convicted of an offence and
the suspension of his sentence remains within the control of the
court. Such arbitrary control was necessary, in the Supreme Court's
view, because it provided a lever so that the probationer would be
reformed under its sanctions and privileges.
The rights which exist in the present Tennessee case seem to be
described by Mr. Justice Hughes when he says,
The question, then, in the case of the revocation of probation, is not one
of formal procedure either with respect to notice or specification of charges
or a trial upon charges. The question is simply whether there has been an
abuse of discretion, and is to be determined in accordance with familiar
principles governing the exercise of judicial discretion.47
Despite this seemingly unequivocal statement, the case should not
be taken as laying down the basic rule on the subject. The facts of
Burns v. United States should be sufficient to distinguish it. Burns'"crime" was abuse of prison privileges with the connivance of a prison
offlcial.48 It would have been difficult to convict him of a criminal
offense on the facts of the case.49 Therefore, the authority of this
case is limited. The Supreme Court may well decide differently in
a case of a probationer who is charged with a serious crime.
Not all state jurisdictions agree with this rule of the Supreme Court,
but, on the other hand, it appears that no court has gone so far as
to say that there must be clear proof of guilt of the alleged crime
which has led to probation violation. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina has approximated this position. State v. Sullivan0 raises
most explicitly the problem of the probationer charged with violating
his probation by allegedly committing a further substantive criminal
offense. Sullivan had been convicted of liquor offenses and sentence
had been suspended. Evidence was introduced on the revocation
hearing "tending to show" that, during the probationary period, the
defendant had further violated the prohibition laws. The majority held
that the defendant was not entitled to prior notice of the hearing,
holding that the very presence of the probationer and his attorney at
the revocation hearing showed conclusively that he had knowledge of
the nature of the hearing and that the revocation was proper.
47. Id. at 221.
48. This was an unusual case in which the defendant was sentenced to imprison-
ment and was to serve a further suspended sentence on his release from prison.
49. Hughes, J., who refers to Act of May 14, 1930, cir. 274, § 9, 46 Stat. 325,
18 U.S.C. § 753h (1958).
50. 127 S.C. 186, 121 S.E. 47 (1923).
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A strong dissent contended that the probationer's constitutional
rights had been violated. While Justice Cothran agreed that the
court had, by imposing suspended sentence, retained jurisdiction over
the defendant, he also believed that the defendant had retained his
right to due process of law and any infringement of that right was an
affront to his personal liberty. He said:
I do not regard [the queston of revocation] as a matter to be determined
by the judicial estimate of what is fair and just, a criterion that in time of
trial . . . may vary with the temper or the interest of the judge, but a
legal, constitutional right, as immovable as a lighthouse on solid granite
fixed. 5'
Justice Cothran believed that in the case of a supposed violation
based on the alleged commission of another offense, the court re-
viewing the suspended sentence should leave the issue in abeyance
until the court trying the probationer had decided on his guilt. Three
years later this dissent persuaded the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina to overrule Sullivan.
52
Later decisions (in other jurisdictions) have not adhered to the
Cothran rule. In a Georgia case,53 the court rejected the defendant's
contention that probation should not be revoked unless he had been
convicted of the new offense. The court decided that this contention
was unsound on the extraordinary basis that,
it is not the record of convictions, but the fact of guilt, which determines
whether the probation should be revoked and in determining this question
the trial judge is not bound by the same rules of evidence as a jury in passing
upon the guilt or innocence of the accused in the first instance. It is
not necessary that the evidence support the finding beyond a reasonable
doubt or even by a preponderance of evidence. 54
The court was prepared to accept, for the purpose of revocation,
inferences arising from the evidence of police officers who had raided
the defendant's house and found lottery equipment there.5
The federal courts have decided cases in the same manner.m The
discretionary quality of probation revocation was described more accu-
51. Id. at 199, 121 S.E. at 51.
52. Renew v: State, 136 S.C. 302, 132 S.E. 613 (1926). This case is clearly in the
minority. See Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 366, 38 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1946),
and the cases cited therein.
53. Bryant v. State, 89 Ga. App. 891, 1 S.E.2d 556 (1954).
54. Id. at 894, 81 S.E.2d at 559.
55. See also Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 51 S.E.2d 571 (1949); Waters v. State,
80 Ga. App. 104, 55 S.E.2d 677 (1949).
56. Campbell v. Aderhold, 36 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1929); Riggs v. United States, 14
F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1926).
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rately by District Judge Sibley in Campbell v. Aderhold when he said
that:
If the judge becomes satisfied that the probation is a failure and the best
interests of the public and the defendant are not being subserved, and that
different treatment is required, he has the right and the duty to terminate
the experiment and let the law take its original course. It may be that the
probationer cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed
a particular crime, and yet his course of conduct along that line may be such
as to satisfy the judge that the probation ought to be revoked.57
The judge also mentioned another most persuasive reason for taking
such a view of revocation. He pointed out that a stricter rule would
result in less frequent resort to probation which, in itself, would
be disadvantageous5 i
In practice, the problem of possible infringement of constitutional
rights is not likely to arise very frequently. The probation officer
usually will follow the better procedure of waiting until the proba-
tioner has been convicted of the substantive crime before filing
complaint of a probation violation.
In those cases, of course, where the probationer has breached a
condition of his probation order such as drinking intoxicating liquor,
associating with known criminals, quitting his job without seeking the
permission of his probation officer or changing his address without
notifying the probation officer, no criminal charge will arise and the
probation officer will use his good judgment in deciding whether to
make a formal report to the sentencing judge.
The only difficult case will be one where the probationer denies
that he has committed any criminal offense which would constitute a
breach of his probation.59 Few cases have examined this problem
closely. Most courts have been satisfied to refer to the privilege of
probation and the discretionary quality of the decision to revoke60
A perceptive concurring judgment by District Judge McDowell in
Riggs61 provides one of the most exhaustive discussions of this prob-
lem which, presumably, has never called for explicit decision in Ten-
nessee. The judge construed the Federal Probation Act as giving ex-
57. Campbell v. Aderhold, supra note 56, at 367.
58. See also Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W. 862 (1921), where the
defendant's probation was revoked because it appeared that he was unlikely to
refrain from further criminal acts. He had possession of a valuable automobile and
could provide no satisfactory explanation for his sudden affluence. He was also in
the constant company of a law-breaker.
59. E.g., Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 109 S.E. 460 (1921).
60. Riggs v. United States, supra note 56, at 6. It was claimed, unsuccessfully, that
the Federal Probation Act was unconstitutional because it encroached on the pardoning
power of the President.
61. Id. at 10.
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press authority to determine the truth of any alleged breach of
condition of probation, including a crime which was alleged to have
been committed during the probationary period. "If the charge is too
trivial," said Judge McDowell, "or too ill-supported, to justify prosecu-
tion in such court, it might properly be ignored by the court which
granted probation."62 Although the decision of the court revoking pro-
bation may not agree with a subsequent trial, the Congress had
provided for a duplication (and possible variance) and the power of
the original court must stand. The judge pointed out that the revoca-
tion of probation does not necessarily have to be consistent because
the revocation does not excuse the new crime.
The judge also intimated that the premature determination re-
garding probation may prejudice the prosecution or defense, depend-
ing on the outcome, but he felt that it was inevitable. The only sug-
gestion which the judge made was that the federal court judge
deciding on probation revocation should refrain from presiding over
the trial of the new crime.
Judge McDowell advised that these difficulties called for caution
in exercising the power of revocation so that justice might be done
and abuses minimized. This is an enigmatic statement at best. The
learned judge recognized the "delicacy" of the problem. He cited the
Cothran dissent in Sullivan v. State,6 and the judgment in Renew.
6 4
Furthermore, the judge rationalized this "premature" power of revoca-
tion as an expression of the best administration of the probation
system. He said:
The majority of probationers are and will be youthful, or at least of less
than normal adult intelligence, and to such persons a power that can be
very promptly exercised is much more respected and efficacious than a
power that can be exercised only after the (frequently slow) processes of
the criminal law have been finally completed.
65
The deterrent effect of a prompt reaction to misbehavior by the
probationer is certainly the experience of most social workers in the
field of probation. Can the law be satisfied with this admittedly
admirable aim in correctional theory and practice? Is this not the
equivalent of saying that "you may not have committed the crime but
we think you were up to something?" Constitutional guarantees are
absent and this was eloquently clear when Judge McDowell said:
The possibility of an acquittal at the criminal trial of a probationer whose
probation has already been revoked may exist in any case. But juries are
62. Id. at 11.
63. Supra note 50.
64. Supra note 52.
65. Supra note 56, at 11-12.
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so frequently influenced by sympathy, or by other improper reasons, that a
subsequent acquittal does not necessarily show that the revocation of
probation was erroneous .... 
66
In Tennessee, the duty of the court which is asked to revoke
probation on the alleged commission of a new crime has had its task
made a little easier, although the propriety of the procedure is, it is
submitted, equally open to objection on constitutional grounds.
Section 40-2907 of the Tennessee Code provides that a judge may
revoke a probation order when the probationer has "been guilty of a
breach of the laws of this state, or shall have been guilty of a
breach of the peace, or any other conduct inconsistent with good
citizenship." This procedure enables the court, on less evidence than
would be required in a regular trial, to revoke probation by choosing
the category (in this case, "conduct inconsistent with good citizen-
ship") which best suits its purpose.
67
Varela v. Merrill6 is an illustration of the stringent viewpoint which
seems to be the majority rule.69 The probation law of Arizona is
very similar to that of California from which it was fashioned; con-
sequently, the Supreme Court of Arizona found support for its findings
in California cases.70 The court, therefore, adopted the view that-the
authority to revoke probation was purely discretionary and a matter of
grace and did not even depend on violation of the specified conditions
of probation. In the problem case of the alleged commission of a
second crime, this viewpoint is, of course, of great importance. The
court can act on "the report of the probation officer, or otherwise"
in cases where the "continued enjoyment of probation may depend
upon the effect which the prisoner's liberty may have upon the peace
or morals of society."71 The court adds that trial by jury or other
manifestations of due process are unnecessary because the proba-
tioner's vulnerable and precarious status subjects him to the dangers
of discretionary action by the original sentencing court. The court
hastens to point out that the decision must be subject to "sound
judgment." Whether such a debonair attitude to the exercise of the
rehabilitative ideal can be countenanced is another matter. The courts
seem to have no difficulty in justifying the wide exercise of power
66. Id. at 12.
67. Finley v. State, 378 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1964). See also Hooper v. State, 201
Tenn. 156, 297 S.W.2d 78 (1956); Thompson v. State, 198 Tenn. 267, 279 S.W.2d
261 (1955); Galyon v. State, 189 Tenn. 505, 226 S.W.2d 270 (1949).
68. 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937).
69. It must be remembered, of course, that the view will change from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, depending on the wording and construction of the legislation relating to
probation, but the Arizona statute does not seem atypical.
70. E.g., In re Young, 121 Cal. App. 711, 10 P.2d 154 (1932).
71. Varella v. Merill, supra note 68, at 574.
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and discretion by both probation officer and judge. The court con-
dones the lack of constitutional safeguards by categorizing the revoca-
tion hearing as something other than a criminal proceeding; the
probationer has agreed to enter into an agreement the terms of which
are made known to him and he assumes the liability of being treated
to a summary proceeding. The courts say that a probationer is not
being tried for an offense but simply confronted with violation of an
agreement. Such legalistic reasoning hardly satisfies a probationer
who has abided by the terms of his suspended sentence and has been
unjustly accused of a new crime.
The short answer is that the probationer is a felon who, in many
respects, has the same rights in the legal process relating to his crime
as a man serving his sentence in prison. Jurisdictions which have
held otherwise have reiterated the pleas for safeguards where liberty
is ,threatened but, of course, it is only a conditional liberty.12
3. Juvenile Court.-In State ex rel. Jackson v. Bomar,73 the defend-
ant, aged seventeen years, was convicted in the Criminal Court of
Davidson County of assault with intent to commit murder and rape.
The defendant was originally brought before the Juvenile Court of
Shelby County so that that court might ascertain whether the nature
of the charges were within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
The court found74 that there was probable cause to believe that the
said minor has been guilty of the crime of rape and assault with
intent to commit murder in the first degree, which would be felonies
if committed by an adult. The court also found that the "minor is
not insane or feeble minded, that said minor is not reasonably suscep-
tible to corrective treatment in any available institution or facility
within the State designed for the treatment and care of children.""
Consequently, the court remanded the defendant for trial in the
criminal court with the results mentioned above.
The defendant contended on appeal that his conviction was void
because he had neither been granted nor offered the aid of legal
counsel when he appeared in the juvenile court. He relied on Hamilton
v. Alabama76 and Gideon v. Wainwright.77
72. But see cases where the legislation has aided these minority courts in coming
to this conclusion. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M.
433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917); Howe v. State ex rel. Pyne, 170 Tenn. 571, 98 S.W.2d
93 (1936) (the Tennessee statute has since been changed); State v. O'Neal, 147
Wash. 169, 265 Pac. 175 (1928); State v. Zolantalds, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044
(1927).
73. 383 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. 1964).
74. Id. at 42.
75. Ibid.
76. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Judge Clement, citing many prior decisions,. 8 held that the rationale
of the two United States Supreme Court cases was inapplicable
because the proceeding in the juvenile court was not a criminal
proceeding. Everyone knows that the juvenile court is an emanation
of the parens patriae principle of equity so that the juvenile
court is concerned with the welfare of the child rather than his guilt
or innocence. Is this principle to override the rights of a minor who,
if he fails in his attempt to keep his case in the juvenile court, will be
facing criminal charges? One would think that the very essence of
the juvenile court proceeding is concerned with protecting a child
against the dangers of being subjected to the brutalization of the adult
criminal court. Are his rights properly protected when he cannot
present his case through counsel? The Tennessee courts have con-
sistently held that a minor's rights are not thereby infringed. The
rationale is that the judge of the juvenile court and his staff are suf-
ficiently trained so that they can properly assess the merits of the
juvenile court retaining jurisdiction over a minor who has performed
acts which would be criminal offenses if committed by an adult.
There are some weaknesses in this formulation. As has been previously
mentioned, there is a growing concern for a protection of the rights
of juveniles,7 9 and if this is a proper trend, despite the concept of
parens patriae,80 then this case is an important and perhaps disturbing
exception to it. Secondly, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee presupposes that a juvenile court judge is adequately
advised by treatment personnel and has the necessary expertise for his
job. Unfortunately, juvenile court judges in most jurisdictions are not
trained for their very important and specialized functions. Finally,
even if the provision of counsel is generally unacceptable or considered
inappropriate in the "non-criminal" proceeding of the juvenile court,
a good argument can be made for allowing the juvenile to be repre-
sented when he is in danger of serious punishment if transferred to
and convicted of adult offences in the adult criminal court. A revision
of the law deserves close consideration. Then again, perhaps the
whole concept of juvenile justice, particularly for those who are more
than sixteen years of age, is in drastic need of re-evaluation.
78. Swan v. District of Columbia, 152 A.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Cinque v. Boyd,
99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923); Juvenile Court v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139
Tenn. 549, 201 S.W. 771 (1918); Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643
(1915).
79. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
80. E.g., The policy of parens patriae is described in the Tennessee juvenile court
law in these words "that the care, custody and discipline of the child shall approxi-
mate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and that so far
as practicable any delinquent shall be treated not as a criminal, but as misdirected and




Even if juvenile courts are not dealing in matters of a criminal
nature, there is every reason for proper presentation of the juvenile's
case. In many courts the investigating staff of juvenile courts are so
over-worked that only meager resources are available for the full
investigation and consideration of a case whereas the provision of
counsel might make a proper presentation possible. Such a view is
not meant to encourage the coddling of juvenile delinquents, but to
protect fundamental rights which may be threatened.
4. Habitual Criminal Laws.-In State ex rel. Ves v. Bomar,81 some
novel points in Tennessee law were settled by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. These points concerned the Habitual Criminal Act and the
court relied on interpretations of similar legislation in other states.
The petitioner claimed that his conviction as an habitual criminal
was void because one of the prior convictions taken into account
occurred before the 1950 amendments to the act. This point had
been previously examined by Tennessee courts82 and the Supreme
Court of the United States. The court held in this case that the
conviction which preceded the 1950 amendment did not render his
present conviction as an habitual criminal ex post facto. The court
relied on the remarks of the Supreme Court in Gryger v. Burke,83 that
the conviction as an habitual criminal cannot be viewed as "either a
new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes." The
habitual criminal status and punishment is to be treated as a
"stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because a repetitive one."
The petitioner also failed in his contention that he was denied
due process when he was indicted as an habitual criminal before
the trial for the fourth felony. The mere wording of the statute
8 4
excluded this assignment of error.
He also claimed that the first felony of which he had been con-
victed, viz, grand larceny in 1947, was commuted to petit larceny
and threfore did not come within section 40-2801 of the Tennessee
Code and should not be counted as a prior conviction. There is little
doubt that the court's rejection of this contention is in accord with
past law. The same decision would have been reached if the first
offence (or any offence) had been pardoned. The United States
Supreme Court has previously held that such holding does not
violate the requirements of due process. This view of habitual criminal
81. 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446 (1964).
82. E.g., Conrad v. State, 202 Tenn. 36, 302 S.W.2d 60 (1957); McCummings v.
State, 175 Tenn. 309, 134 S.W.2d 151 (1939).
83. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
84. TEN. CoDE ANN. § 40-2801 (1955).
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laws shows clearly the policy behind these laws. As was clear in the
examination of probation revocation, the law's preoccupation with
constitutional safeguards ends when a proper finding of guilt is
pronounced. After that stage, the criminal offender is divested of
many rights besides those encompassed in the term "due process."
They include some manifestations of citizenship. Therefore, the policy
of the habitual criminal laws come into effect. The felon who has
been convicted on four occasions has shown society that it must pro-
tect itself from his depredations, that no further principles of the
rehabilitative ideal can be applied to him. This would certainly apply
to a felon who has been convicted of felonies on four occasions even if
one of the convictions was later reduced to a misdemeanor. Should
it apply equally to a man who has not been convicted of the requisite
four felonies prior to being charged as an habitual criminal? If the
executive has pardoned him, the relevant crime is no longer a con-
viction against him and therefore he does not technically come within
the habitual criminal statute. The overwhelming weight of authority
is in favour of holding that a conviction as an habitual criminal is
proper in such circumstances.8 5
C. Procedural Considerations
1. Search and Seizure.-In recent years, the Supreme Court of the
United States has re-examined many criminal law problems.8 6 Some
of the most crucial have re-evaluated the role of the police officer in
the administration of criminal law. These decisions have been con-
troversial and yet, in many instances the Supreme Court has simply
been applying the best procedures, for arrest, search and seizure and
the reception of confessions, which have been in operation in many
jurisdictions for a number of years.8 7
There seem to be basic flaws in the law and procedure of arrests and
searches and seizures which befog the constitutional issues surround-
ing these common police practices. On the one hand, the laws tend
to be extremely technical, with false, imprecise and illogical distinc-
tions drawn between searches and arrests with a warrant and those
85. Carlesi v. People, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
86. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note
77; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
87. An excellent illustration is found in a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit where it was held that the appellants' murder convictions
could not stand because before taking their confessions the police did not advise the
appellants of their right to counsel and their right to remain silent. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation had been using this procedure for-,some time. In Tennessee,
(as well as California, Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon and Rhode Island), the courts have
made the same holding as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1965, p. 1, col 3, p. 24, col. 3.
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without, between searches incidental to arrest and others, between
searches on suspicion of commission of a felony and similar searches
in the belief that a misdemeanor has been committed. Not all the
fault lies on the side of the laws as laid down by statute and court
decision. Admittedly, the laws are difficult to understand but the
common and sometimes unforgiveable mistakes made by police
officers have led to the quashing of otherwise just convictions. The
administrators of our police departments must ensure that their officers
are better versed in the applicable law.
More cases in the reports concern searches and arrests than any
other topic in the criminal law (with the exception of the current
right to counsel cases). The basic problem is one of public protection
versus personal rights. Our democratic society does not believe that
criminals should be apprehended and punished at any price. Instead,
we believe that the police and other members of the law-enforcement
team have the final onus of proving the crime and if their modus
operandi is of dubious legality, the law must release the accused. Yet,
society has experienced an increase in criminal activity and the
United States has the unfortunate distinction of having a greater
crime problem than any other country. Therefore, the need for
efficient police forces is all the more necessary. Efficiency should not,
however, be equated with officiousnes-whether this latter quality
is bred by ignorance of the proper procedure or by some more sinister
motive. These confusions persist despite the guarantees of the fourth
amendment and the Mapp v. Ohio decision.8s
In Fox v. State, 9 the accused had been arrested when a police
officer had reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been com-
mitted or was about to be committed. On this routine basis, the
arrest was legal. Therefore, one would assume that any search made
would be similarly lawful. The evidence produced by search of the
automobile of the defendant Fox was inadmissible for two reasons.
The court held that the search was illegal because the consent he gave
to have his car searched was given under circumstances suggesting
"an act of necessity rather than of volition."90 If an accused voluntarily
consents to a search, he may thereby waive his constitutional right,9'
88: Supra note 86.
89. 383 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1964).
90. Id. at 28.
91. E.g., Simmons v. State, 210 Tenn. 443, 360 S.W.2d 10 (1962). See Simmons
v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964). In the United States District Court,
judge Miller pointed out that mere acquiescence or consent in the face of an an-
nounced or apparent intention to search with or without a warrant or permission does
'not constitute a waiver. See also Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Catala-
iotte-v United-States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d
649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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but in these circumstances the consent was held not to be voluntary.
Dyer, J., relied on the 1923 case of Hampton v. State,92 where a
search had been made on a warrant declared illegal because of its
generality. With respect, it is difficult to see how the facts of Fox
can produce the same result. The facts of Hampton were different
because the search warrant was illegal, whereas, in the present case,
there is no evidence of any flaw in the warrant. Therefore, the
question of consent can only arise where there is no valid warrant.
Coercion certainly cannot be used when the police officers have no
warrant,93 but that was not the case here.
The second point raised by the appellant Fox shows that the
search warrant was probably illegal for some reasons not described in
the report. Fox contended that the search (presumably without war-
rant) was illegal because, contrary to state argument, it was not
incidental to the arrest. The automobile was not searched at the
time or place of arrest. There is clear authority from United States
Supreme Court decisions that an arrest is not incidental unless it is
"substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the
immediate vicinity of the arrest."94
Searches sufficiently incidental to arrests are clearly legal in Ten-
nessee. 95 In Warden v. State,9 6 the court held that a search without
a warrant, even if it precedes the arrest, may still be legal if the search
and arrest were approximately simultaneous and could be regarded as
part of the same transaction.97 A different conclusion was reached
in Larkins v. State98 where the State claimed that two searches were
in fact one transaction, the second search being a mere continuation
of the first. The search was declared illegal. A first search warrant
which was executed on December 8th was declared illegal because
a supporting affidavit was dated December 11th. A second search
warrant was sworn out and executed on December 12th. The court
held that the evidence produced by both searches was inadmissible
despite the fact that a presumably valid arrest of the defendant had
been made in the meantime. The court cited the remarks of Mr.
92. 148 Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007 (1923).
93. E.g., Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S.W.2d 273 (1930).
94. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964).
95. See Shafer v. State, 381 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. 1964); White v. State, 210 Tenn.
78, 356 S.W.2d 411 (1962); Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856 (1955");
Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1946); Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn.
203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938); Dittberner v. State, 155 Tenn. 102, 29 S.W. 839 (1926);
Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1922).
96. 379 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. 1964).
97. Cf. State v. Duffy, 135 Ore. 290, 295 Pac. 953 (1931); State v. Daniel, 115
Ore. 187, 237 Pac. 373 (1925).
98. 376 S.W.2d 459 (Tenn. 1964).
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Justice Cardozo in People v. Defore,99 when he said: "Means unlawful
in their inception do not become lawful by relation when suspicion
ripens into discovery."'
The limits of the search warrant are well shown in State v. Sircy.'10
The police had obtained a search warrant authorizing immediate
search of premises at a particular address including any outhouse
or automobile found upon or in the premises. The police were seeking
contraband narcotic drugs. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that the search of the defendant's automobile was illegal because
Sircy was not named in the warrant and therefore was "a stranger to
the process." The police officer swearing out the warrant had no
probable cause to believe that the present defendant was connected
with the immediate activities which the police sought to prevent
by means of the search warrant.
In any event, the terms of the warrant issued were very broad
which, in itself, may have been sufficient to strike down search war-
rants in other courts and jurisdictions. Once again Sircy raises d~fficult
questions for police officers working in the field. What is the proper
balance between the apprehension of criminals and the invasion of
personal freedoms? The police officers undoubtedly found unlawful
objects (viz. burglary instruments) secreted in Sircy's car, but they
had no reason to believe that he was connected in any criminal
enterprise with those named in the search warrant. Would the result
have been the same if the police had found contraband narcotics
instead of lock picks? The court gives no hint. Technically, of course,
the police had no probable cause concerning Sircy's activities but
perhaps the court would have inferred the necessary connection in
these circumstances to bring the defendant's automobile within the
warrant's legal boundaries. Alternatively, would the defendant have
been similarly successful if he had in fact been working with the
suspected criminals named in the warrant? Obiter dictum in Sircy
gives us some indication of the disposition on this point. The court
might have decided the case differently if there was evidence that the
defendant had been under the control of the persons named in the
99. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
100. Id. at 19, 150 N.E. at 586.
The decision in United States v. Williams, 230 F. Supp. 47 (1961), also raises some
interesting related points. The district court recognized Tennessee law that arrest for
misdemeanor does not give an officer the right to search the defendant's automobile.
It was held, however, that if officers observed moonshine whiskey in the automobile
before arrest of the driver for traffic violations, or simultaneously with or incident to
such arrest, it was not necessary for them to have made a search of the automobile
to warrant taking possession of the whiskey. The further general point was made
that a search is not necessary when the goods searched for can be observed with the
naked eye.
101. 383 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1964).
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warrant or if the police had reasonable cause for so believing. 10 2
An analogous problem was facing the court in Fox v. State.1 3 The
court held that the evidence obtained by an illegal search of the auto-
mobile of Fox was admissible against Fox's co-defendant. The co-
defendant was, presumably, not a "stranger to the process." He
was not mentioned in the search warrant, but that was not the
criterion accepted by the court. He was a co-defendant in the subse-
quent trial and that was held to be a sufficient connection. There
was little discussion of the point'04 and no mention was made of the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.10 5 Presumably, the court believed
that the Mapp rule did not apply because the co-defendant's property
rights or privacy, exclusive of the illicit goods actually seized, had not
been invaded'06
Surely, the application of the Mapp v. Ohio rule should not be
restricted by technicalities of tenure. The exclusionary rule laid
down by that case is meant to protect private citizens from the
possible abuses of police power. The defendant escapes punishment
for the simple reason that "the constable has blundered."1' 7 In People
v. Cahan,10 8 the Supreme Court of California adopted the exclusionary
rule. Judge Traynor observed that in a case where the "very purpose
of an illegal search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a
trial, the success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the court's
lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be introduced." 0 9 The
judge also cited Wigmore" 0 who said: "any system of administration
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsive self-
disclosure as a source of proof must itself morally suffer thereby." The
aftermath of the Cahan decision does not show an appreciable in-
crease in California crime. The Attorney General for the state reported
that the overall effects of the decision were "excellent." He hoped
that it would result in better education and training for police
officers."'
Shafer v. State"2 also raised some important points in relation to
102. Id. at 40.
103. 383 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1964).
104. Templeton v. State, 196 Tenn. 90, 264 S.W.2d 565 (1954), and Moody v.
State, 159 Tenn. 245, 17 S.W.2d 919 (1929), were cited.
105. Supra note 86.
106. See cases cited in DAHL & Bomi, PROCEDUE AND THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH
AND S LZuRE, 129-31 nn.34-38 (1961).
107. People v. Defore, supra note 99, at 21 (Cardozo, J.,); People v. Caban, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
108. People v. Cahan, supra note 107.
109. I& at 445, 282 P.2d at 912.
110. 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
111. Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 515, 538 (1957).
112. 381 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. 1964).
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search and seizure. This case provided a clear example of the difficulty
of deciding what is a "reasonable" search, not only in terms of facilitat-
ing police work, but in relation to the protection of fundamental
rights. First, police authority was challenged on the basis of the
ambiquities in the items which may be seized in a search. The
appellants claimed that Code sections 39-908 and 39-909 were un-
constitutional under federal and Tennessee law because they are
vague and ambiguous. The appellants claimed that the "possession
of burglars' tools" was vague and would cast a net so wide that a
law-abiding citizen could not escape involvement. Their objection
failed. The court gave little consideration to the problem outside the
citation of a few cases and an announcement that it was a novel point
in Tennessee. Nevertheless, the appellants were making an important
point although it had little merit in their case.113 The description of
"burglars' tools" is necessarily vague and we must rely on the
integrity, good judgment and discretion of judges and police officers
to use their power wisely.
The appellants also contended that the search of their belongings
and automobile was illegal and, therefore, the evidence was excluded
under the rule in Mapp v. Ohio."4 In short, the court decided that,
on the facts, their submission had no merit. Two reasons were given
for this ruling. The appellants had invited the police officers (who had
properly identified themselves) into the motel room where the
appellants were staying and where some of the burglars' tools were
found. Secondly, the search was incidental to the arrest which was
declared lawful. Undoubtedly, the defendants had invited the police
into their motel room. There is clear authority" 5 that the constitu-
tional right to demand a search warrant may be waived under such
circumstances. The recent United States District Court case of Sim-
mons v. Bomar,"6 showed this. The appellant claimed that he did
not immediately recognize the police officers who called at his home.
The police had not announced their authority or purpose before
entering the dwelling. They did not use force or fraud to make the
entry as their knock on the door was answered by an invitation to
enter. Very soon Simmons knew their identity and the purpose of the
visit. The police had offered to return later with a warrant, but the
appellant acquiesced. The court held that mere acquiescence would
113. In the circumstances, the court's attitude was understandable because the police
search produced the following items: a drill, a sledge hammer, nitroglycerin and
other explosives, a crowbar, a deputy sheriff's badge, one pair of handcuffs, 85 auto-
mobile keys, 4 flashlights, adhesive tape, chisels, pliers, 12 drills, an oxygen tank,
acetylene tank, hoses, gauges for use on the tanks, goggles and gloves.
114. Supra note 86.
115. Supra note 91.
116. 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
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not have been sufficient waiver, but the offer of the police to get a
search warrant (which was waived) made the transaction properly
consensual.
The only other circumstances under which the search would have
been illegal would arise if the police officer's announcement that
he had information had been a falsehood or based on less than
probable cause.
Judge Miller said in Simmons v. Bomar that:
if in fact at the time permission was given to search without a warrant, the
officers would not have been able to obtain a search warrant, then it might
be argued that the waiver was based upon misrepresentation or mistake and
was therefore invalid.117
In Shafer, it seems most unlikely that the police officers could have
obtained a search warrant. Does the mere fact that the defendants
acquiesced in the officers' entry into the motel room to discuss a
possible charge of assault or rape, make all subsequent inquiries and
searches permissible in evidence against the defendants? None of the
evidence linked the defendants with the assault, but led to charges of
carrying a pistol with intent to go armed and possession of burglarious
tools. The case cited by the court as "most nearly like" the present
one is, with respect, very different. Although the police in Honig v.
United States"18 did not have a warrant to search or arrest, but
simply to make inquiries, the evidence discovered (with the consent
of the accused) was directly related to the complaint about which
they were inquiring. Presumably, the consent of Shafer was sufficient
to make the evidence, of whatever nature, admissible against them.
The law would appear to be clear on this point despite apparent in-
justices. The United States Supreme Court has said, in the case of a
search under warrant, that although the warrant did not cover
the articles seized, the arrest for the offense being committed in the
presence of the officers authorized the search and seizure of the
articles." 9 More specifically, the same court has held that if an
entry upon premises is authorized (which was no doubt the case in
Shafer), "there is nothing in the fourth amendment which inhibits the
117. Id. at 229.
118. 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953).
119. Morron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). See also United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). In the latter case, Mr. Justice Minton added a
practical note when he said: "It is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus
to determine, considering the time element alone, that there was time to procure a
search warrant .... The judgment of the officers as to when to close the trap on a
criminal committing a crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to
believe is committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there was time
to procure a search warrant. Some flexibility will be awarded law officers engaged
in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential." Id. at 65.
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seizure [of goods] the possession of which is a crime, even though
the officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when
the search is initiated."m Yet, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held (and Mapp v. Ohio has probably strengthened rather
than weakened the rule) that a search, whether incident to arrest or
not, cannot be justified by what it turns up.121 The only difficulty
for Shafer is that he consented to an entry of his motel room by
police officers. Should he be able to claim that his consent was more
one of necessity than volition?m At least one federal case would agree
that his consent was not freely given.m Furthermore, the defendant's
motel room could be treated as his "castle."
The second basis for holding that the search was a proper one was
that the search was incidental to an arrest. This ground is extremely
doubtful because the original police actions were purely inquiries' 24
on information which amounted to less than probable cause. The
complaint made had no relation whatsoever to the goods which were
found in the motel room and, subsequently, in the automobile. The
authorities are clearly against declaring such searches valid.125 To
allow such searches would invite police officers to go on "fishing
expeditions."
The problem is one of cause and effect.uo If we admit that the
120. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1941). See the forceful dissent of
Frankfurter, J., id. at 167. Cf. United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E. D. Tenn.
1961).
121. See People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955) (Traynor, J.,)
(dictum). See also People v. Verrette, 224 Cal. App. 2d 638, 36 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1964);
Parker v. State, 177 Tenn. 380, 150 S.W.2d 725 (1941).
122. See Fox, supra note 103.
123. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960) (involving the search
of an apartment).
124. Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VANi. L. REv. 509 (1949), points out
that "in searches properly incidental to a lawful arrest, an officer may seize weapons or
tools [Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938); Hughes v. State, 145
Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1922)], contraband the very possession of which is criminal
[Reynolds v. State, 136 Miss. 329, 101 So. 485 (1924)], the fruits of crime such as
stolen property [Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145], the instrumentalities and
means by which crime is committed, and any article which 'might tend to evidence
his guilt of the offense for which the arrest has been made.' (Elliott, supra; Hughes,
supra) " Id. at 623.
125. E.g., Benge v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. App. 1959); Brinegar v.
State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
126. Hughes v. State, supra note 124: "An officer cannot lawfully arrest a person
without a warrant and search his person for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not he has violated the law. Even if the person arrested were in fact violating the
law, the offense was not in legal contemplation committed in the presence of the
officer, and such an arrest is unauthorized, where the facts constituting the offense are
incapable of being observed or are not observed by the officer." Id. at 569, 238 S.W.
at 595. Cf. Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn. 682, 257 S.W. 79 (1923). This case, how-
ever, is less satisfactory than the former. See also People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d. 740,
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defendant in Shafer waived his rights to invoke the Mapp v. Ohio rule,
then the search would be reasonable and, therefore, lawful. The
search produced the evidence for the arrest to which part of the
seized goods were incidental. The best solution one can hope for is
a proper judicial disposition of the problems. In light of this dilemma,
the application of a rule analogous to fackson v. Denno,1 7 (relating
to confessions) is desirable. Tennessee has always used this rule in
testing the voluntariness of confessions, viz, the judge hears all the
evidence and then rules on voluntariness for purposes of the admis-
sibility of the confession and the jury considers the voluntariness as
affecting the weight or credibility of the confession. The supreme
court in Shafer upheld the defendant's contention that the same rule
should be applied to an examination of the legality of a search and the
admissibility of the evidence so obtained. This seems the best solution
because it is impossible to lay down rigid, a priori tests in such cir-
cumstances. There is no "litmus paper test" which can be applied.
In the examination of any problem relating to search warrants, the
searching police officer's conduct must be examined. The primary
question that must be answered is: Did the officer have the probable
cause? 'What, then, is "Probable cause"? This term defies strict defini-
tion and must be decided on the facts of each case. In Batchelor v.
State, 28 there was no difficulty. Information received by the police
from an unidentified informer that the defendant had "some whiskey"
in his automobile was held not sufficient cause to arrest the defendant
without a warrant on this ground alone.m In United States v. Plem-
mons, 30 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
makes some useful comments on probable cause. They relied on the
remarks of the Supreme Court in Dumbra v. United States'31 that in
the determination of probable cause, the court is "not called upon to
determine whether the offence charged has in fact been committed."
The court is solely concerned with examining the reasonableness of the
grounds upon which the warrant is issued. In Simmons v. Bomar,32
the court said that the information on which a policeman relies need
not be proved accurate but the officer should have no reason to doubt
36 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1964); People v. Ruhman, 22 Cal. App. 2d 284, 36 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1964); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1964); Wockenfuss v.
State, 382 S.W.2d 939 (Tenn. 1964).
127. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
128. 378 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1964).
129. In the circumstances, this successful objection was to no avail because the
whiskey was clearly visible when the officer asked the defendant to alight from his
car, and therefore the search was not illegal. See also McBride v. State, 200 Tenn. 100,
290 S.W.2d 648 (1956).
130. 336 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1964).
131. 268 U.S. 435 (1925).
132. 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
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the reliability of such information. It can be based on hearsay evidence
and the officer's own knowledge of the defendant's reputation and
criminal activities. The test suggested was that of "a reasonable
discreet and prudent man" who would "be led to believe that there
was a commission of the offense charged." 33 The quantum of proof
required is less than for determination of guilt. Probable cause
requires knowledge and belief on a balance of probabilities. To have
a more stringent test would of course place impossible burdens on
the law enforcement agencies. The court also pointed out that the
existence of probable cause is a subjective consideration, very highly
dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. In testing
the validity of any warrant, the affidavit of the officer applying must
be read as a whole.
The most important point made in Plemmons was that many fact
situations, whether being examined by a police officer or an issuing
court, are ambiguous. Consequently, "the determination that probable
cause exists should be accepted by this Court unless it is shown that
the Commissioner's judgment was arbitrarily exercised."'134 In this
statement is seen the agonizingly delicate balance between the pro-
tection of the individual against arbitrary interference by "authority"
and the need for the police to protect the society by the apprehension
of those who refuse to adhere to community standards.
This is a recurrent dilemma and it is hoped that the courts will
never be overcome by the blandishments of authority that the capture
and conviction of a maximum number of criminals has an absolute
priority in our society.
2. Separate Sovereignty over Criminal Behavior.-The Supreme
Court of the United States has made it clear that it does not con-
stitute a violation of due process for a defendant to be tried and
convicted, on the same set of facts, in both state and federal criminal
courts. The rationale has been that the two jurisdictions are the
creatures of separate sovereignties, and are, therefore, autonomous.
Mr. Justice Black, who dissented in Bartkus v. Illinois,135 condemned
the holding in this case as a denial of due process under the guise of
federalism.
The authorities, including a 1964 Tennessee case, 136 appear perfectly
clear that a similar separate sovereignties doctrine applies so that a
133. 268 U.S. at 441. See also Brinegar v. United States, supra note 125 at 175-76;
Carroll v. United States, supra note 125, at 162.
134. 336 F.2d 731, 733 (1964), citing United States v. Nicholson, 303 F.2d 300,
332 (6th Cir. 1962).
135. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
136. Mullins v. State, 380 S.W.2d 201 (Tenn. 1964).
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defendant may be convicted for violating a city ordinance and for
the circumvention of a state law.
II. CRnMI . PROCEDURE
A. Limitations on Prosecution
1. Jurisdiction.-Does a court have jurisdiction to convict a defend-
ant of a violation of a criminal statute which was enacted by an
unconstitutionally malapportioned legislature? The Tennessee Supreme
Court in States ex rel. Fralix'5 held in effect the affirmative, refusing
to declare invalid the acts of "our malapportioned Legislature,"' 38 and
affirming the judgment of a lower court which had denied habeas
corpus to a petitioner who had argued the contrary. The court fol-
lowed the lead of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit' 39 in concluding that the de facto doctrine and the doctrine
of avoidance of chaos and confusion applied and dictated such a
result.
B. Proceedings Preliminary to Trial
1. Arrest.-Prior to its amendment in 1961, Tennessee Code section
40-2907 had provided that when it comes to the attention of the
trial judge that any defendant whose sentence has been suspended
has been guilty of a breach of the laws of the state, of a breach of the
peace, or of any other conduct inconsistent with good citizenship, the
trial judge shall have power to issue "a notice to such defendant, which
notice shall contain in brief form the nature of the charges made
against such defendant and shall also require him to appear before
the trial judge . . . not less than five (5) days from the execution of
such notice." The statute had provided further procedure whereby
such suspension might be revoked. In a 1956 decision, Hooper v.
State,14 the supreme court interpreted this provision for notice as
requiring only that the defendant be informed generally of the charge
against which he is called upon to defend so that it can be shown
whether the charge has been inspired by mistake or malice. The
amendment of section 40-2907 in 1961 eliminated express references to
notice. The amended section provides in pertinent part that
Whenever it shall come to the attention of the trial judge that any de-
fendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty
137. 381 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1964).
138. Id. at 298.
139. Dawson v. Bomar, 332 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933
(1964). The Tennessee Supreme Court had previously indicated its attitude on the
question in State ex rel. Smith v. Bomar, 368 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 915 (1964).
140. 201 Tenn. 156, 297 S.W.2d 78 (1956).
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of any breach of the laws of this state or who has violated the conditions of
his probation, the trial judge shall have the power in his discretion to cause
to be issued under his hand a warrant for the arrest of such defendant as
in any other criminal case.1
41
Recently, in Davenport v. State,42 the supreme court noted the
changed wording of this section, stating that "there is no provision
in the statute as to the nature of the notice, if any, to be given the
violator."'4 In that case, the trial court, based upon an affidavit
alleging specific unlawful conduct on the part of the defendant, had
issued a bench warrant for the defendant's arrest charging her with
having violated the terms of a previously suspended sentence, and,
following a hearing, had revoked the suspension and reinstated the
original sentence. On appeal the defendant contended that the bench
warrant was insufficient to give reasonable notice that a hearing would
be held to determine whether or not the suspended sentence should
be revoked. The supreme court found that the bench warrant had
been issued upon an affidavit reciting evidence that the defendant
had breached the law and violated the terms of her suspended
sentence; that the bench warrant referred to the fact that the affidavit
had been made; that the defendant had "committed the offense of
violating the conditions of a suspended sentence imposed February 25,
1963"; and that the warrant directed the executing officer to arrest and
bring before the trial court the named defendant "to answer the
charge of violating the conditions of her suspended sentence." Ap-
parently, the supreme court intended to make the point that there had
been enough notice to the defendant here to have satisfied the statute
even when it specifically required notice. But the court made this
somewhat curious statement:
Since the notice provision was completely deleted from the amended
statute, we think it is obvious that the Legislature intended for the rule as
laid down in Hooper v. State, supra, to control. Clearly, under that rule,
the notice in the present warrant is sufficient to make known to the de-
fendant generally the charges that she is called to defend.144
Although amended section 40-2907 does not expressly require notice,
it is reasonable to imply such a requirement because it does au-
thorize the trial judge upon stated circumstances to issue a "warrant for
the arrest of such defendant as in any other criminal case." An
arrest warrant "in any other criminal case," properly issued, gives the
party to be arrested notice of what offense he is alleged to have com-
141. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-2907 (1956).
142. 381 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1964).
143. Id. at 278.
144. Id. at 278-79.
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mitted.145 It seems appropriate, therefore, for the interpretation stated
by the court in the Hooper case to be applied now to the amended
statute.
2. Preliminary Examination.-After an unsuccessful attempt in the
Tennessee state courts to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee for habeas corpus, which petition was denied
on the grounds that on its face no constitutional rights of the petitioner
had been violated. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the petitioner contended that his constitutional rights had
been violated in that he had not been given a proper preliminary
hearing and had been bound over from the office of the Memphis
Chief of Police to the Shelby County grand jury without having been
confronted with the witnesses against him. The court of appeals, in
Green v. Bomar,146 affirmed.
The court concluded that, assuming that the appellant had not been
given a preliminary hearing, 147 this did not constitute a denial of due
process of law. This conclusion seems to be correct. Although the
Tennessee Code requires that no person can be committed to prison
for a criminal matter until examination thereof is first had before a
magistrate, 148 and although the code has detailed requirements as to
the conduct of the preliminary examination,149 the code has not been
interpreted as establishing the preliminary examination as a prere-
quisite to a lawful indictment and conviction. 150 Thus, the holding
is in accord with the general rule that, absent a controlling statute, a
preliminary examination is not an essential prerequisite to the finding
of an indictment.151 It has long been held that, so far as federal
prosecutions are concerned, "The Constitution does not require any
145. Th:NN. CoDE ANN. § 40-707 (1956); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 7. See generally
Perkins, supra note 124, at 530-44.
146. 329 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1964).
147. The court noted that the trial judge in Division I of the Criminal Court of
Davidson County in his order denying appellant's petition there for habeas corpus
said that the petitioner had admitted in a hearing before that court that he had had
a preliminary hearing in which he pleaded guilty and was bound over to the grand
jury. Id. at 797 n.1.
148. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-604 (1956). A temporary holding of a suspect by
the police has been held not to be a committal to prison and not a violation of the
code provision. Hardin v. State, 210 Tenn. 116, 355 S.W.2d 105 (1962); East v. State,
197 Tenn. 644, 277 S.W.2d 361 (1955); Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d
332 (1944).
149. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1101 to -1130 (1956).
150. The return of an indictment has been held to authorize the arrest of the
indicted person without the necessity of a preliminary examination. Shaw v. State,
164 Tenn. 196, 47 S.W.2d 92 (1932).
151. 4 WHARToN, CanmAL LAw AND PnocEnup. § 1730 (Anderson ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited as WHALRToN].
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preliminary hearing before a person charged with a crime against the
United States is brought into the Court having jurisdiction of the
charge."15 2 The Constitution, not requiring a preliminary examination
in prosecutions by the United States, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment should not operate to bind such a require-
ment on the state. The Sixth Circuit's decision that due process
does not require such an examination in a state prosecution confirms
what had previously been thought in this regard.1
53
The court also concluded that, assuming that the state omitted to
hold a preliminary examination, such omission did not violate the
appellant's rights under the sixth amendment "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." The court quoted the language of the
sixth amendment, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . .. ."
and pointed out that the appellant had been accorded that right when
he had been prosecuted at a trial in which he was convicted by the
testimony of witnesses who testified against him in open court and
in his presence.15
4
3. Grand fury-Evidence.-At common law it was said that only
legally competent evidence should be heard by the grand jury.
155
Particularly, it has been said that hearsay evidence upon questions
before a grand jury is no more admissible than upon trial of the
cause before the court.156 But what if a person indicted by a grand
jury later claims that the indictment came after the grand jury heard
incompetent evidence, such as hearsay? There generally has been a
lack of agreement among American jurisdictions as to this problem
area. The consensus is that, although some improper evidence was
heard, the indictment is valid if there was other competent proof
received upon which it could have been based.
5 7
The jurisdictions are widely split concerning what result should be
reached when there is a challenge to an indictment on the ground
that there was no evidence before the grand jury, or only incompetent
152. Mr. Justice Holmes for the United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Gault,
271 U.S. 142, 149 (1926). Also holding that "there is no constitutional right to a
preliminary hearing": United States v. Heideman, 21 F.R.D. 335, 337 (D.D.C.),
aff'd, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959 (1959).
153. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Prosecutions, 30 TENN. L. REV.
420, 434 (1963). See also State v. Tominaga, 45 Hawaii 604, 372 P.2d 356 (1962).
154. In support of this conclusion, the court cited Goldsby v. United States, 160
U.S. 70 (1895); McDonald v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U. S. 665 (1942); and Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939).
155. ORFIELD, CRPm-AL PROCEDURE FRom ArmEST TO APPEAL 162-63 (1947);
Comment, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1955).
156. 1 UNDERmLL, CRnNAL EviDENcE § 76 (5th ed. Herrick 1956) [hereinafter
cited as UNDERHILL].
157. Ibid.; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 567, 573 (1929).
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evidence is presented. Some courts hold that an indictment should be
quashed if it plainly appears to the court to have been based entirely
on incompetent or illegal evidence. 58 Other courts absolutely refuse
to inquire into the evidence that may have been before the grand
jury with a view to setting aside an indictment.
159
Ruling in an area wherein the courts of appeals had been divided,
the United States Supreme Court a few years ago in Costello v.
United States,60 concluded for the federal courts that a defendant in
a criminal case may be required to stand trial where only hearsay
evidence was presented to the grand jury which indicted him, and
that all the fifth amendment requires is that the indictment, if valid
on its face, be returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
jury. The Supreme Court in Costello seemed to take the extreme
position that federal courts are not to look behind the indictment even
if it be attacked as having been returned without the grand jury
having heard any substantial or rationally persuasive evidence.16' This
was not the opinion of Judge Learned Hand, whose decision the
Supreme Court affirmed in Costello, for Judge Hand said that in such
a situation "the grand jury would have in substance abdicated."162
In Burton v. State, 63 the Tennessee Supreme Court was faced with
a contention that the trial court had erred in not allowing the defend-
ants at a hearing on a plea in abatement to cross-examine the prose-
cutor (apparently the only witness who had testified before the grand
jury) in an effort to show that substantial portions of his testimony
had been hearsay. The court overruled the contention, citing decisions
of other jurisdictions holding that the legality and sufficiency of evi-
dence heard by the grand jury is not subject to review. The court
also relied substantially upon the reasoning of the Costello decision
that, if indictments were open to challenge on the ground that
the evidence before the grand jury was inadequate or incompe-
tent, there would be great delay in criminal cases since before a trial
on the merits, the defendants could always insist on a kind of preli-
minary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of evidence
158. See 4 WHmAToN § 1852, and the cases cited therein.
159. 1 UNDErHmLL § ,76. This has been said to be a minority view. ORFmLn, op.
cit. supra note 19, at 163. It has also been said to be the majority view. Annot.,
31 A.L.R. 1479 (1924).
160. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), 9 ALA. L. REv. 92 (1956),
55 Micr. L. RErv. 289 (1956). This decision affirmed United States v. Costello, 221
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955), 43 CALiF. L. REv. 859 (1955), 24 FonHmm L. REv. 453
(1955), 69 HAv. L. REv. 383 (1955), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1955), 65 YALE L.J.
390 (1956). See also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
161. The opinion for the Court in the Costello case was so read by Justice Burton
in his concurring opinion. 350 U.S. at 364-65.
162. 221 F.2d at 677.
163. 377 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1964).
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before the grand jury. The court noted that the prosecuting witness
at the trial had demonstrated on the merits that he knew of his own
knowledge facts ample to establish the offenses charged. But it does
not appear from the report of the Burton decision to what extent
the grand jury heard this kind of non-hearsay testimony. In the view
of the author, it is to be hoped that the Tennessee Court has not
gone so far as to hold, as the United States Supreme Court apparently
did in the Costello case, that the indictment may not be looked
behind, even in order to see if it were returned without any sub-
stantial or rationally persuasive evidence, or so far as to hold that
an indictment may not be challenged even on the ground that the
grand jury heard no evidence of probative value. If the Burton deci-
sion is that far-reaching, with the result that a grand jury may return
an indictment under such circumstances, then, in a real sense, a grand
jury so conducting itself will have "in substance abdicated."
4. Indictments.'W-As a rule, defects or omissions in an indictment
which run only to form are waived by failure of the accused
to object appropriately in the preliminary stages of the proceeding.
Further, pleading to an indictment is commonly held to be an admis-
sion that it is a genuine record; for example, by pleading not guilty,
without previously objecting, a defendant waives such insufficiency of
manner or form of the indictment as constitutes only a defective
statement of the accusation against him.165
In this vein, the Tennessee Supreme Court a number of years ago
held that an objection for want of a prosecutor on the indictment may
be made by motion to quash or by plea in abatement,166 but that
such an objection is waived unless made before a plea to the merits. 67
The court in Estes v. State,16 decided during the survey period, held,
consistent with principles previously adopted,169 that the sheriff being
listed as prosecutor rather than the person alleged in the indictment to
have been the intended victim of an assault with intent to murder was
at most an irregularity which was waived by a plea to the merits
without objection having been previously made.
Also, it is well settled under Tennessee law that if a criminal
defendant at the trial level makes no effort to correct a technical defect
in his indictment, the ensuing verdict cures the defect. This principle
164. See also text accompanying notes 155-162 supra.
165. 4 WH~mToN § 1881.
166. Wattingham v. State, 37 Tenn. 24 (1857).
167. Brooks v. State, 156 Tenn. 451, 2 S.W.2d 705 (1928). See also Johnson v.
State, 187 Tenn. 438, 215 S.W.2d 816 (1948); Blackman v. State, 169 Tenn. 197,
83 S.W.2d 899 (1935); CAnuTHaas, HIsT ROy OF A LAWsurr 724 (8th ed. Gilreath &
Aderholt 1963).
168. 381 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1964).
169. The court relied on Brooks v. State, supra note 167.
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was recognized during the survey period by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in affirming a district court judgment
denying, on this principle of state law, a writ of habeas corpus to a
state prisoner who had petitioned on the ground of an alleged defect
in his indictment.170
The rules discussed above, however, do not apply to defects or
omissions in the indictment, or in the mode of finding the indictment,
which are of such fundamental character as to make the indictment
completely invalid. Such fundamental defects or omissions are not
waived by a defendant's failure to raise them by a preliminary motion
or plea or by pleading to the merits.' In Warden v. State,172 the
Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged but refused to apply the
rule that an indictment which in its statement of a cause of action
contains a defect that would be fatal on a motion to quash is cured
on trial if the issues made by the pleadings require proof of the
facts defectively stated or omitted in the indictment.1 3 Although the
defendants in Warden had not moved to quash the indictment against
them, on appeal the court held that the indictment was so defective as
to be void-the indictment had failed to state a cause of action, making
it void rather than voidable-and the necessary facts not averred in it
could not be proved at trial.
The indictment in Warden, after charging defendants with pos-
session of intoxicating liquors on March 30, 1963, further charged
that
the offense herein presented is a second or subsequent violation of Section
39-2527, Tenn. Code Ann. and as such constitutes a felony as provided by
Section 39-2528, Tenn. Code Ann., the defendants having heretofore in this
Court and by this Grand Jury been indicted for possession of intoxicating
liquors in violation of Sect. 39-2527, T.C.A., on Jan. 19, 1963, on January 22,
1963, and on January 26, 1963, and upon conviction for either of said
offenses, the offense herein presented is a felony. 7 4
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that this indictment failed to
state facts sufficient in law to constitute the elements of the second-
offense felony of which the defendants were convicted below (the
170. Kimbro v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1964). The court quoted the district
court's conclusion, with which it said it was in accord as follows: "The petition does
not indicate that any effort was made to correct the alleged defect on the trial level
If indeed such defect existed, it was cured by the verdict under Tennessee law. Jones
v. State, 197 Tenn. 667, 277 S.W.2d 371 (1954); Driscoll v. State, 191 Tenn. 186,
232 S.W.2d 28 (1950); Pope v. State, 149 Tenn. 176, 258 S.W. 775 (1923)." 333 F.2d
at 757.
171. 4 WHARToN § 1881.
172. 381 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. 1964).
173. Id. at 246, citing Magevney v. Karsch, 167 Tenn. 32, 48 S.W.2d 562 (1933).
174. 381 S.W.2d at 245.
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elements being possession of liquor for sale and that this is a second or
subsequent possession). The statute under which the Warden defend-
ants had been convicted, Code section 39-2528, makes a felony of "a
second or subsequent violation of any of the provisions of § 39-2527."Y75
The indictment stated that "the offense presented is a second or sub-
sequent violation of Section 39-2527 Tenn. Code Ann." and further
stated that the defendants had on the previous occasions been in-
dicted for violation of Code section 39-2527. The supreme court held
that the indictment was insufficient to charge a felony under section
39-2528 because, to do so, it must aver the fact of conviction of
prior possession, whereas it only averred an indictment for previous
violations plus a hypothetical averment that "upon conviction of
either of said offenses, the offense herein presented is a felony."''7
The court in Warden also concluded that defendants' indictment
was bad for not giving them proper notice of the offense charged.
The court invoked the provision in the state Constitution that in
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right "to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him"'177 and the statutory provision
that "the indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, . . . in such a manner as to enable
a person of common understanding to know what is intended .... ,,78
Although the indictment stated that the "offense herein presented is
a second or subsequent violation" of section 39-2527, and a felony
under section 39-2528, the court held179 that if it did not contain,
as required by long-standing judicial precedent, "a complete descrip-
tion of such facts and circumstances as constituted the crime," 18 but
was a mere statement of a legal result or conclusion and, therefore,
insufficient to inform the defendants of what they were required
to meet. When a statute provides, as here, for increased punishment
for a second or subsequent offense, the court concluded that, among
the circumstances that should be described in the indictment, are"such circumstances of time and place as to inform the accused of
what proofs of prior offenses may be offered against him and enable
175. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2528 (1956). Section 39-2527 makes it a misdemeanor
for a person to have intoxicating liquors intended for sale.
176. 381 S.W.2d at 245-46. In this connection, the court pointed out that another
section of the Code not here involved [TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2504 (1956)], making
second or subsequent sales of intoxicating liquor a felony, expressly provides as an
element that there must have been a previous conviction. This hardly seems to support
the court's conclusion that an element of the felony in § 39-2928 likewise is prior
conviction, when § 39-2.528 does not expressly require prior conviction as an element.
177. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
178. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1802 (1956).
179. 381 S.W.2d at 245-46.
180. Cornell .v. -State, 66 Tenn. 520, 523 (1874); Pearce v. State, 33 Tenn. 44,
46-47 (1853).
[ VOL. 181168
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE1
him to be prepared to make his defense." 8"
Clark v. State8 2 holds that an indictment under Code section
39-605 (assault and battery with intent to commit rape) or under
section 39-606 (assault and battery with intent carnally to know a
female under twelve) includes the section 39-603 crime, attempt to
commit a felony.1
83
As a general rule, only one offense can be charged in the same
count of an indictment or presentment, and if more are so charged
the count is said to be double and bad for duplicity.8 4 However, it
has been held that when one crime is an essential element of another
and more serious offense, an indictment is not duplicitous for charging
both crimes.8 5 A number of years ago a Tennessee decision 18 6 held an
indictment good that charged in the same count the offenses of
larceny and house breaking. During the survey period, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, in Gamble v. State,187 relying on that previous deci-
sion, held good an indictment that in a single count charged burglary
and larceny. In so doing, the court quoted the following statement
with approval:
Burglary and larceny are an exception to the general rule that two distinct
offenses cannot be charged in the same count, and an indictment charging
both burglary and larceny cannot be demurred to on the ground of duplicity.
The exception is as well established as the rule itself and it is clear that a
burglary and a larceny committed at the same time may b, thus united.1
C. Trial
1. Speedy Trial.-Although various jurisdictions differ as to the
point in time when the right to a speedy trial commences, in no
jurisdiction does it begin before some charge or arrest is made 89-
perhaps because the original purpose of this right was to prevent
181. 381 S.W.2d at 246, citing In re Boyd, 189 F. Supp. 113 (M.D. Tenn. 1959),
aff'd sub nom., Bomar v. Boyd, 281 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1960); Rhea v. Edwards, 136
F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); Frost v. State, 205 Tenn. 671, 330 S.W.2d 303
(1959); Frost v. State, 203 Tenn. 549, 314 S.W.2d 33 (1958).
182. 381 S.W.2d 898 (Tenn. 1964).
183. It is not clear whether the defendant in the case was convicted of assault
with intent to commit a felony or of an attempt to commit a felony, since the court
referred to each of these offenses, respectively at page 899 and at page 900 of the
opinion. Both are provided for in § 39-603, and presumably the rule stated by
the court would apply to either of them. See also Jones v. State, 200 Tenn. 429, 292
S.W.2d 713 (1956).
184. CARumTams, op. cit. supra note 167, § 725 at 869.
185. 5 WHARToN § 1933, at 33, and the cases cited therein.
186. Williams v. State, 1 Tenn. (Shannon) 473, 474 (1875).
187. 383 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1964).
188. Id. at 53, quoting 13 Am. JuR. 2d Burglary § 41, at 346 (1964).




unreasonable imprisonment without trial.1'0 (If an accused has any
right resulting from a delay of the state in bringing its prosecution,
it would be in the form of a procedural bar, the statute of limitations,
if any, applicable to the offense alleged).
That Tennessee follows the uniform rule in this regard was shown
again recently in Burton v. State.'91 A store was burglarized in
Greene County, Tennessee, on February 17, 1956. Defendants were
apprehended in Indiana on February 18, 1956, and were convicted on
March 1, 1956, for a criminal offense in that state. While on bond
pending appeal of their conviction, on July 5, 1957, they went to
another state, where they were subsequently arrested by the FBI and
returned to Indiana on August 23, 1958. They were confined in prison
in Indiana until August 31, 1962. They were indicted in Greene
County, Tennessee, on September 5, 1962, for the 1956 burglary, but
resisted extradition until February 1963, when they were returned
to Tennessee. Their trial began on May 15, 1963. The Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, overruling their contention
that the trial court committed error in holding that their rights to
a speedy trial, guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion, had not been denied under the circumstances related. Noting
that, from a few days after the burglary until September 1, 1962, the
defendants had been confined in an Indiana penal institution, or were
on bail pending appeal from an Indiana conviction, or were fugitive
from Indiana authorities, the court observed that Indiana need not
have surrendered defendants to Tennessee during that period even if
extradition had been sought then. The court approved statements
that the right to a speedy trial begins with the arrest or commence-
ment of prosecution, 192 and that
A 'speedy trial' . . . means a trial as soon after indictment as the prosecu-
tion can, with reasonable diligence prepare for it, without needless, vexa-
tious, or oppressive delay, having in view, however, its regulation and
conduct by fixed rules of law, any delay created by the operation of which
rules does not in legal contemplation work prejudice to the constitutional
right of the accused.193
2. Fair Trial."k-Among other conclusions in the DavenporW9 case,
the court stated that the constitutional right to a fair trial is not
190. PERXiNs, CASES ON CivmuAL ILAW AN PnocxaunE 937 (2d ed. 1959).
191. 377 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1964).
192. Id. at 902, citing 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(4), at 26 (1961).
193. 377 S.W.2d at 902, quoting, with emphasis added, Arrowsmith v. State, 131
Tenn. 480,488 (1914).
194. See also text accompanying notes 198-202 infra.
195. 381 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1964).
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involved in a proceeding to revoke a suspended sentence, it being
assumed that the defendant had previously been given a fair trial
before conviction and sentence.
196
3. Severance for Trial.-Three individuals, Monts, West, and Olds
by name, were indicted for a felony. Olds moved the trial court for
a severance of his case for trial, but his motion was denied. All three
defendants were convicted and sentenced. Monts and West appealed,
but Olds did not. Contending that the denial of Olds" motion below
operated as a denial to him, Monts on appeal assigned as error the
failure of the trial court to sever his case for trial from that of
the other defendants. The supreme court in Monts v. State 97 held
that, for a denial of a motion for severance to be assignable as error
on appeal, the motion must have been made by the party assigning it;
the fact that one defendant made a motion is of no benefit to another
defendant on appeal who did not, because the former may have had
grounds not applicable to the latter. Further, the court noted, even
if the trial judge had granted Olds' motion, that still would not have
effected a severance of Monts' trial from that of West. Because there
had been no exercise of discretion by the trial court on a matter
raised by Monts, the supreme court held that Monts' assignment of
error in this regard was without proper foundation on review and
overruled it.
4. Appointment of Court Reporter.-The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Polk v. Bomar,198 affirmed a district
court order denying habeas corpus to one who claimed that the
failure of the Tennessee trial court, in which he was convicted of
robbery and armed robbery, to appoint a court reporter pursuant to
a provision of the state Code' 99 violated his constitutional right to a
fair trial. The court held that no constitutional right of defendant
was violated in his trial. The court rested its decision on these
points: (1) There was no evidence that the defendant needed a
196. The court quoted with approval 5 WHAnTON § 2194, where it is stated that
in a hearing on revocation of a suspended sentence, "the hearing is summary" and "the
defendant is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not convicted and is
merely on trial upon an accusation of crime." 381 S.W.2d at 279.
197. 379 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964).
198. 336 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1964).
199. "Whenever any party shall be indicted and arraigned upon any indictment of
presentment on which the death penalty may be inflicted and the district attorney
general in charge of the prosecution shall make it known that he intends to insist upon
the infliction of capital punishment and such defendant be financially unable to employ
counsel and the trial court be required to appoint counsel for such defendant, the
trial judge then after making due inquiry and investigation as to the financial condition
of the accused may in his discretion appoint a capable court reporter to report such
trial... ." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2010 (1956).
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court reporter in order to perfect the record on appeal, particularly
inasmuch as Tennessee courts not only permit narrative bills of excep-
tions but actually prefer them to stenographers' transcripts; 2°0 the
United States Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of narra-
tive bills of exceptions,201 and there was no evidence that a narrative
or some other kind of exception could not have been prepared if
defendant had really wanted to appeal; (2) no prejudice resulted to
defendant from the failure of the trial court to furnish him a court
reporter, since, although advised of his right to appeal, he did not
appeal; and (3) if he had a right under the Tennessee Code to a
court reporter, he waived it.
202
5. Jury-Separation of Jurors.-It has long been the rule in Tennessee
that the separation of jurors in felony cases, even before being sworn,
constitutes reversible error unless it is shown that there was no
tampering with the jurors while separated.0 3 A few years ago
the supreme court acknowledged that this is the rule only in Ten-
nessee and Mississippi.204 The general rule elsewhere is that separa-
tion of jurors in a felony case before they are sworn is not reversible
error unless it is affirmatively shown that prejudice resulted to the
defendant. 205 The requirement that the jury not separate has been
based in Tennessee 2 6 on the provision in the state constitution guar-
anteeing an accused "trial, by an impartial jury," 207 and the theory
that the accused is therefore entitled not to have jurors go at large
where they may possibly be contaminated and influenced.2 8
During the survey period it was urged upon the supreme court in
State v. Fowler °9 that it was reversible error for a trial court not to
have declared a mistrial when a separation of the jury occurred
before it was sworn, even though no prejudice thereby to the de-
fendant was shown. The supreme court preliminarily noted that the
state's separation-of-jurors-reversible-error rule is based on the theory
that a juror who separates himself from his fellows places himself in
200. Tucker v. Tennessee, 210 Tenn. 646, 361 S.W.2d 494 (1961); Beadle v. State,
203 Tenn. 97, 310 S.W.2d 157 (1958).
201. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955); Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192
(1942). See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
202. The court cited Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 102 A.2d 267 (1954); Common-
wealth ex rel. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. 323, 74 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub noin.,
Turk v. Claudy, 340 U.S. 907 (1950).
203. Wesley v. State, 30 Tenn. 344 (1852); Hines v. State, 27 Tenn. 476 (1848).
204. England v. State, 196 Tenn. 186, 194, 264 S.W.2d 815, 819 (1954).
205. 5 WiMToN § 2103.
206. Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 179 S.W. 145 (1915); Long v. State, 132 Tenn.
649, 179 S.W. 315 (1915).
207. TENN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9.
208. See note 206 supra.
209. 373 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. 1963).
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a position in which he might be tampered with, so that a court will
not speculate as to whether an injury resulted to the accused
from the unexplained separation. The court then held the rule
inapplicable in this case, that reversible error was not committed be-
cause the trial court discharged the two jurors who had separated
themselves,210 and upon questioning the remaining jurors it received
from them the statement that no one had talked to them, thereby
removing any chance that the jury which tried the case had been
tampered with or that prejudice had resulted to the defendants. Re-
gardless of what one may think of the Tennessee rule, the result
reached in the Fowler case seems correct.
6. Confrontation of Witnesses.-An accused in a criminal prose-
cution in Tennessee has, under the federal constitution,21' the state
constitution,2 12 and the state criminal code,2 13 the right to confront
the witnesses against him.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, empha-
sizing that the right of confrontation concerns the prosecution itself,
recently concluded that an accused had been accorded his rights in
this regard when he was convicted on the testimony of witnesses who
testified against him at his trial in open court and in his presence.
The court held that this right was not violated by omission of a
preliminary examination.214
In State ex rel. Dickens v. Bomar,215 the Tennessee Supreme Court
considered the argument that a defendant in a robbery prosecution
had been denied his right to confront witnesses when the State failed
to call as a witness at the trial the individual who allegedly had been
210. The Court cited Griffee v. State, 69 Tenn. 41 (1878), and Taylor v. State, 79
Tenn. 708 (1883). In the Griffee case, the trial court, upon being apprised that two
of six jurors selected but unsworn had improperly separated themselves from the re-
maining four, discharged all six and allowed the case to proceed to trial. The supreme
court approved the trial court's discharge of all six jurors, including the four "who had
ample opportunity to have been tainted by their night's association with the offending
jurors" because "a jury should be above suspicion." Id. at 43. The court held
in the Taylor case that after a panel is made up but before it is sworn a trial court may
discharge a juror for cause without being compelled to discharge the remaining jurors.
211. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The United
States Supreme Court has held that this sixth amendment provision is a fundamental
right made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment, and that this right
must be accorded the accused in a state prosecution under the standards that apply
in a federal proceeding. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965).
212. "That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right ... to meet the
witnesses face to face ...." TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
213. "By the Constitution, the accused, in all criminal prosecutions has a right to
meet the witnesses face to face .... ." Tin. CODE ANN. § 40-2405 (1956).
214. Green v. Bomar, 329 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1964).
215. 381 S.W.2d 287 (Tenn. 1964).
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the victim of the robbery. The court concluded that the right to
confrontation does not require the state to call every witness having
knowledge of the facts, citing Eason v. State,2 16 a previous decision
in which the court had held that the State would not be compelled
to make out its case by introducing any particular witness, for "if it be
important to the proper defense of the defendant, he can always have
the witness in his favor."217
The right of confrontation was also invoked in State ex rel. Byrd v.
Bomar.218 There it was contended that this right of the accused under
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution was violated
since he "was not confronted with all the witnesses against him, which
were named on the face of the indictment to be summoned for the
State." The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this contention because
it was not alleged that the accused had been denied the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him who actually testified at the
trial. The court again relied upon Eason. It also relied on secondary
authority to the effect that the right of confrontation is "only the right
to meet those witnesses face to face whose testimony is offered at the
trial" and that "the fact that the prosecution does not produce all the
witnesses is not a violation of such constitutional provision, even
though the name of one of the witnesses is endorsed on the informa-
tion."21
9
7. Evidence.-Evidentiary questions involved in some of the criminal
cases reported during the past year are treated elsewhere in this
survey, 2 0 but they are footnoted herez22 as a convenience to the reader.
216. 65 Tenn. 431 (1873).
217. Id. at 436.
218. 381 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1964).
219. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 999, at 1047 (1961). See also Aycock v. United
States, 62 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 734 (1933); Hood v.
State, 80 Okla. Crim. 175, 157 P.2d 918 (1945); 2 UNDEamLL § 515.
220. Patterson, Evidence-1964 Tennessee Survey, 18 VAND. L. Ruv. 1221 (1965).
221. Admissions: Boulton v. State, 377 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. 1964) (rule of "admis-
sions by silence"-that when a statement is made accusing one of a crime and he
makes no denial by word or gesture, both the statement and his failure to deny it are
admissible as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth-should be applied with circum-
spection and such evidence should be received with great caution); State v. Fowler,
373 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. 1963) (rule of "admissions by silence" applied, evidence that
defendants hung heads and made no audible response to statements by accomplices
implicating them admissible to corroborate accomplices' testimony). Business records:
Gamble v. State, 383 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1964) (written logs made by police depart-
ment radio dispatcher contemporaneously with all radio dispatches, showing for the
night that a crime was committed the time of police radio calls, the number of the
police car dispatched, and the place to which dispatched, admissible under the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act, TENN. CoDE ANNe. § 24-712, despite contention that
tape recordings of the dispatches and not the logs were best evidence, and despite
subsequent notations on the log when it was explained to the jury that these additions
were not part of the original record to be considered by them). Confessions: Monts v.
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8. Improper Argument.-In his closing argument at the trial of the
Gamble case, 2 an attorney for the State commented that the record
was silent as to the identity of a woman that a defendant claimed he
was with at the time the offense charged was committed. That the
trial court permitted such argument to be made was assigned as error
to the supreme court, the contention being that this was a comment
on the defendant's failure to testify. The court overruled this assign-
ment, holding that the comment was not on the failure of the
accused to testify (such comment would have been improper), 22
but on the absence of any evidence in the record on the point in
question, and therefore that the comment was not improper.2
State, 379 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964) (facts that at the time he confessed to a crime de-
fendant had been without sleep for 24 hours and had just heard from the police of the
accidental death of his son do not render the confession involuntary and inadmissible).
Corroboration: Monts v. State, supra (an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice
within the rule requiring that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated); Boulton
v. State, supra (evidence which merely casts a suspicion on an accused or which only
shows he had an opportunity to commit the crime is legally insufficient to corroborate the
accomplice's testimony); State v. Fowler, supra (evidence that defendants were seen
talking with admitted accomplices the night of the crime, that a vehicle belonging to
one of the defendants was seen near the scene of the crime on the night in ques-
tion, that ashes of burned paper were found on the farm of another defendant at a
spot where accomplices confessed the group had destroyed stolen papers, and actions of
defendants in hanging their heads and making no audible response when confronted
with accomplices and their implicating confessions, all together sufficient to corroborate
accomplices' testimony). Cross examination: Payne v. State, 379 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn.
1964) (trial court's refusal to permit defendant to cross-examine State's rebuttal witness,
who had testified that he would not believe defense witnesses under oath, with
reference to source of knowledge and information on which rebuttal witness based
his conclusion, was prejudicial error, where jury treated testimony of defense witness
as impeached); State v. Fowler, supra (not error for judge to permit district attorney
general, in order to test credibility as a witness, to cross examine a defendant as to
specific previous acts which involve moral turpitude or other misconduct which tends
to show his lack of veracity or untrustworthiness). Cumulative evidence: Monts v.
State, supra (not error for judge to deny defendant's request that the jury be permitted
to observe a demonstration of the machine upon which his confession had been origi-
nally recorded-for purpose of showing that the machine could have been manipulated
to omit some of defendant's statements-because it would merely be cumulative of
fact already admitted by a State's witness that some of defendant's statements had
not been recorded). Presumptions and inferences: Cann v. State, 383 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn.
1964) (presumptions that homicide is malicious, that handling a weapon so as to
make killing a natural or probable consequence is malicious, and that use of a deadly
weapon is sufficient to sustain a charge of second degree murder are not rebutted
where evidence showed defendant went on deceased's property with a deadly weapon,
was responsible for ensuing argument, provoked use of deadly weapons, fired shots
first, and refused to care for his wounded adversary); Harvey v. State, 376 S.W.2d
497 (Tenn. 1964) (inference that possessor of recently stolen goods stole them does
not operate where verdict of guilty only on a count of receiving and concealing
operated as acquittal of larceny as charged in another count).
222. 383 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1964).
223. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-2403 (1956).
224. The court quoted the following statement: "It is of course, now well settled
that our statute (Code Section 9783) (now T.C.A. § 40-2403) providing that no
presumption of guilt of the defendant shall arise from his failure to testify in his own
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Also in the Gamble case, in arguing to the jury that his client should
not be convicted because the State had withheld at the trial tape
recordings of certain police radio dispatches, defense counsel stated,
"Let me ask you one other question about how fair they have played
with you in the proof in this case." At this point, an attorney for the
State objected to the argument and interjected the comment that "if
they want this tape, I'll play it right now." The defense counsel
moved for a mistrial, the motion was overruled, and the trial court's
action in that regard was assigned to the supreme court as error.
Invoking the Harmless Error Statute, 25 the Court overruled this assign-
ment, holding that, although the State's attorney should not have
made the statement offering to play the tape recording, the result of
the trial was not in any way affected thereby. In this connection, the
court also referred, as apropos, to the fact that it had held previously26
that statements otherwise improper may be made by counsel when
opposing counsel has opened up the subject. This, of course, is the
sometimes criticized227 "doctrine of retaliation."228
9. Instructions.-In the Gamble case,z29 the court was once again
presented with the question of whether a trial judge had given an
oral charge contrary to the statutory requirement 230 that in felony
cases the judge's entire charge shall be reduced to writing before
being given to the jury. The supreme court considered the trial
judge's oral statements23' referring the jurors to a particular written
behalf, has application only to the personal testimony of the defendant himself and
does not extend to apparently available testimony by others." Ford v. State, 184 Tenn.
443, 449, 19 S.W.2d 313,317 (1945). The court also relied upon Hays v. State,
159 Tenn. 388, 201 S.W.2d 539 (1929). 383 S.W.2d at 59.
225. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-117 (1956).
226. Coke v. State, 208 Tenn. 248, 345 S.W.2d 673 (1961).
227. "[The] doctrine of retaliation . . .seems undesirable as it is almost impossible
to determine accurately the effect of the comparative misconduct of the parties."
ORFE LD, CRIMUIAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 65 (1947).
228. 5 WHARTON § 2083. The court quotes 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1108, at
215 (1961), where it is stated that the doctrine of retaliation is applied to comments
"on failure to introduce certain evidence." 383 S.W.2d at 58.
229. 383 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1964).
230. "On the trial of all felonies, every word of the judge's charge shall be reduced
to writing before given to the jury, and no part of it whatever shall be delivered orally
in any such case, but shall be delivered wholly in writing. Every word of the charge
shall be written, and read from the writing, which shall be filed with the papers, and
the jury shall take it out with them upon their retirement." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2516
(1956).
231. The relevant facts are reported as follows:
"The record shows that, after a little over three hours deliberation, the following
occurred:
"'Jury knocked on Jury Room Door and told the Deputy Sheriff they had reached a
Verdict but to be instructed how to write the verdict.'
"The Court thereupon ordered the jury brought into the courtroom. The jacket in the
case was passed to the Court. The Court then stated:
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charge previously given them so that they might now correct the form
of their verdict. And the court held that, pursuant to precedent that
"statements as to the form... of the verdict need not be in writing,"
2
such oral statements by the trial judge did not constitute reversible
* error.
The Criminal Code provides that "if the attorneys on either side
desire further instructions given to the jury, they shall write precisely
what they desire the judge to say further."233 This provision, enacted
in 1873, was early held to be mandatoryP 4 In time, however, it came
to be held that in felony cases the provision is not mandatory as to
certain fundamental points; concerning those particular points, the
supreme court holds it to be reversible error for the trial judge to
fail to charge the jury even though not required by statute, nor
requested by a party, to do so. These points have been limited to
charges in felony cases on the identity of the accused,235 reasonable
doubt, 36 the weight to be given a dying declaration,2 7 circumstantial
evidence when the case is based solely thereon,238 alibi,.29 and the
"'Gentlemen, the form of your verdict-now, the Court is referring only to the form,
Mr. Foreman; it does not correspond to the instructions. The verdict has to correspond
to the form the Court outlined to you in writing. Referring only, now, gentlemen,
to the form of your verdict, not the content, you will find the form in the jacket.
Another matter relating to the form where you used the names of your defendants
in your verdict, gentlemen of the jury, name the defendants as outlined for you. The
Court feels you should return to the Jury Room and be guided more by the written
form for your verdict; so you'll return to your room.
"(JURY OUT) (2:30 p.m.) (RECESS) (JURY IN) (2:32 p.m.)
"'THE COURT: Gentlemen, the Court addresses you again as to the form. The
Court is not referring to the contents of the verdict. Now, Mr. Foreman,-Mr. Brown,
you served as Foreman, according to the form of your verdict you have named the
defendants and you have language immediately after that-relating only to the form
of the verdict.
"'JURY FOREMAN: May I say something, please?
"'THE COURT: Don't go into the content of the verdict. You should strike out
where you have the words "or any of them".'
"Thereupon the jury retired to the jury room and in three minutes returned into
open Court with their verdict, which was accepted by the Trial Judge." 383 S.W.2d
at 54.
232. "'The charge or instruction required by law to be reduced to writing is only
that which the court may have to say to the jury in regard to the principles of law
applicable to the case and to the evidence . . . statements as to the form or character
of the verdict' need not be in writing." Taylor v. State, 369 S.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Tenn.
1963), quoting from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1301 (1961). The court also relied on
Frady v. State, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter) 349 (1875).
233. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2517 (1956).
234. State v. Becton, 66 Tenn. 138 (1874).
235. Ford v. State, 101 Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898).
236. Frazier v. State, 117 Tenn. 430, 100 S.W. 94 (1906).
237. Pearson v. State, 143 Tenn. 385, 226 S.W. 538 (1920).
238. Bishop v. State, 199 Tenn. 428, 287 S.W.2d 49 (1956), 24 TEN. L. Rnv. 886
(1957); Webb v. State, 140 Tenn. 205, 203 S.W. 955 (1918).
239. Poe v. State, 212 Tenn. 413, 370 S.W.2d 488 (1963).
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rights of one when his home is broken into.240
In the Monts case,241 the court considered once more whether it
should expand this "class denominated as fundamental" 242 to include
a charge on circumstantial evidence when the State's case is made up
of both circumstantial and direct evidence. The conclusion of the
court in its original opinion was in the negative, the court holding
as it had in a number of previous cases 243 that the subject matter of
such a charge is not fundamental and that, therefore, the mandatory
provision of the code that attorneys submit to the judge written
requests for instructions that they desire to be given to the jury is
applicable. Because the bill of exceptions by defendant Monts did
not show that he had requested a charge on the law of circumstantial
evidence, the supreme court in its original opinion and on petition
for rehearing held that the conviction could not be reversed for
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law of circum-
stantial evidence, although the case against him involved circumstan-
tial as well as direct evidence.244
However, the supreme court reversed the conviction of Monts' co-
defendant, West, finding error in the refusal of the trial court to give
a requested charge on the law of circumstantial evidence when the
evidence against West was both circumstantial and direct. The court
reasoned as follows:
When a case is grounded on both circumstantial and direct evidence, it is
entirely possible that the jury, in the exercise of its function as the sole
judge of the credibility of the evidence, may find that the direct evidence
is unworthy of belief. If they should so find, then they would be left
with only the circumstantial evidence to guide them in determining whether
the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. But without the law of
circumstantial evidence before them, how can they be expected to properly
evaluate this evidence? The possibility that we have just mentioned makes
it imperative that the trial judge instruct the jury on the law of circum-
stantial evidence. 245
The court, interestingly enough, recognized that the rationale of the
rule it was adopting would apply with equal force to all cases
involving both circumstantial and direct evidence regardless of
whether a request for instructions on circumstantial evidence be sub-
mitted. But, as noted above, the court reversed West's conviction
240. Morrison v. State, 212 Tenn. 633, 371 S.W.2d 441 (1963).
241. 379 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964).
242. Bishop v. State, supra note 238, at 433, 287 S.W.2d at 49; Webb v. State, supra
note 238, at 206, 203 S.W. at 955.
243. Arterburn v. State, 208 Tenn. 141, 344 S.W.2d 362 (1961); Wooten v. State,
203 Tenn. 473, 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958); Gray v. State, 203 Tenn. 332, 313 S.W.2d
246 (1958); Moon v. State, 146 Tenn. 319, 242 S.W. 39 (1921); Barnards v. State,
88 Tenn. 183, 12 S.W. 431 (1889).
244. 379 S.W.2d at 42, 44.
245. 379 S.W.2d at 41.
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but did not in its original opinion or on petition for rehearing reverse
Monts', although both defendants were convicted of the murder
of the same individual in a trial in which both circumstantial and
direct evidence had been presented against them and in which the
trial judge's instructions did not include a charge on the law of
circumstantial evidence. The controlling distinction lay in the facts
as they first appeared to the supreme court on appeal, that West's
lawyer had requested, but Monts' lawyer had not requested, instruc-
tions on circumstantial evidence and had been turned down (although
it might have occurred to the supreme court that a trial court would
very likely have ruled the same way on identical such requests by
co-defendants for instructions).
On a second petition for rehearing the supreme court was able to
determine, from a certificate filed with it by the clerk of the trial
court subsequent to the original decision and the decision on the
first petition for rehearing, that Monts had specially requested the
trial court for instructions on circumstantial evidence. The supreme
court, therefore, on the basis of its decision as to defendant West
likewise reversed and remanded the lower court decision as to Monts.
If, in spite of section 40-2517, a trial judge is required in a case
consisting entirely of circumstantial evidence to charge the jury
concerning circumstantial evidence whether or not requested to do
so, why would the trial judge in a case consisting of both circum-
stantial and direct evidence not be likewise required to give a charge
about circumstantial evidence although not requested to do so, in
view of the supreme court's recognition, in its original opinion in
Monts, that in the latter case a jury may disregard the direct evidence
and find a defendant guilty entirely on the basis of circumstantial
evidence? Once the direct evidence is disregarded, the position of
the defendant in the latter case becomes that of the defendant in the
former case. And, because the direct evidence may be disregarded,
the charge as to circumstantial evidence seems to be just as necessary
in the latter as in the former case. The matter seems to be as much of
the "class denominated as fundamental" in the one case as in the
other. The position of the defendant on appeal in either case should
not depend on whether or not his lawyer thought to make the request.
The important thing should be: was the instruction given?
10. Verdict.-It was held in Harvey v. State2 that a guilty verdict
on one count only of an indictment operates as an acquittal on the
remaining counts of the indictment.27
246. 376 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1964).
247. Citing State v. Abernathy, 153 Tenn. 441, 284 S.W. 361 (1926). See also 5
WHARTON § 2129; ORFmrLD, op. cit. supra note 227, at 475.
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11. Motions after Verdict.-The rule is well settled in Tennessee
that a motion for a new trial is only a pleading and cannot be looked
to as establishing facts which it alleges.248 On the first petition for
rehearing in the Monts case, 49 counsel for defendant Monts contended
that the supreme court erred in its original opinion in stating that
Monts did not request the trial court to charge the jury on the law of
circumstantial evidence. In support of his contention that Monts had
in fact made such a request, counsel called attention to Monts'
motion below for a new trial alleging that the trial court had erred
in refusing to grant Monts' special request for such a charge. The
supreme court invoked the rule referred to above, holding that it was
not sufficient that the motion for a new trial included a statement
that a request for instructions had been made. The bill of exceptions
failing to show such a request, the court held that the motion for a
new trial could not supply evidence that the request had been made.
211
D. Penalties
The criminal code provides that, in the event of conviction for
petit larceny or for receiving stolen goods under the value of 100
dollars, the court may on the jury's recommendation substitute for
punishment in the penitentiary imprisonment in the county jail or
workhouse; it further provides that in such cases, upon the defendant's
demand, the jury shall as a part of their verdict assess all the punish-
ment for the offense and may, in lieu of punishment in the peniten-
tiary, substitute imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse for any
time less than one year.251 In the report on Lax v. State,25 2 it is stated
at one point that the defendant was convicted of receiving and con-
cealing stolen property having a value of more than 100 dollars,2 3 and
at another that his conviction was for receiving property stolen
outside of the state.2 54 The jury set as his punishment eleven months
and twenty-nine days on the county road and payment of a fifty
dollar fine. A motion by the defendant for a new trial was overruled
248. Hargrove v. State, 199 Tenn. 25, 281 S.W.2d 692 (1955); Hagood v. State, 183
Tenn. 49, 190 S.W.2d 1023 (1945); CvAuTaHms, HIsToRY OF A LAwsurr 421 (8th ed.
Gilreath & Aderolt 1963).
249. 379 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964).
250. Id. at 44. See also Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944).
251. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4205 (Supp. 1964).
252. 378 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1964).
253. Id. at 783. Without more, this would appear to refer to the offense of receiving
and concealing stolen goods of a value over $100, for which the penalty by statute
is imprisonment in the penitentiary for from three to ten years. TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-4217 (Supp. 1964).
254. 378 S.w.2d at 786. This appears to refer to the offense of receiving personal
property stolen outside of the state, for which the penalty by statute is punishment
"as in the case of larceny." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4219 (1956).
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except that "Defendant is re-sentenced to eleven (11) months and
twenty-nine (29) days, six (6) months of which is suspended on pay-
ment of $50.00 fine and all costs of the cause and on good behavior
of the defendant." On appeal, the defendant assigned as error that the
jury's verdict was void because it fixed a punishment unauthorized by
law for the offense of which he was convicted. The supreme court
affirmed the judgment. In so doing, it relied on a previous decisionF5
which held that a conviction of grand larceny included a finding of
guilt of petit larceny as a lesser included offense and that a sentence
for grand larceny could therefore be corrected, when the value of
the stolen property had not been proved to be in excess of the
statutory amount, so as to sentence the defendant to the minimum
statutory punishment for petit larceny. In the instant case, the court.
reasoned that, since according to the evidence the property received
was worth more than 100 dollars and thus the conviction of receiving
stolen property worth more than 100 dollars was warranted, such
conviction necessarily was in effect also a conviction of receiving stolen
property worth less than 100 dollars. Therefore, the sentence ap-
propriate to the lesser offense as recommended by the jury was
authorized. In any event, the court pointed out, the evidence would
have justified the jury in assessing the penalty at from three to ten
years in the penitentiary for the greater offense and if the trial court
and jury erred in setting the lesser sentence it was to the defendant's
benefit and therefore not reversible error in view of the Harmless
Error Statute.25
During the survey period the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit handed down a decision concerning the Tennessee
Habitual Criminal Act,57 which should be of interest to the state's
bench and bar.
In Goss v. Bomar,258 this act was challenged by an appellant from
a district court decision denying a petition for habeas corpus, as
having been applied to him so as to constitute "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments
of the Constitution of the United States. The petitioner, an inmate of
the state penitentiary, contended that the life sentence without possi-
bility of parole which had been imposed on him was so grossly exces-
sive and disproportionate to his offenses as to thus violate the
Constitution. The court of appeals recognized that habitual criminal
statutes (existing in forty-four of the fifty-six states and separate
255. Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220, 180 S.W.2d 900 (1944).
256. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-117 (1956).
257. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 to -2807 (1956). See Note, Out of Sight, Out of
Mind: The Plight of the Habitual Criminal, 26 TENN. L. BEv. 258, 259 (1959).
258. 337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964).
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federal jurisdictions) are not unusual in this country, and that
provision for life sentence for repeating offenders is not unusual under
such statutes (being present in thirty-four of them). But the court
took note of the petitioner's contention that his situation was un-
usual in that (1) three of his prior convictions were entered upon
the same day as a result of offenses committed in a seventeen
day period, (2) the Tennessee statute under the circumstances of
his case makes a life sentence mandatory without any exercise of
discretion by judge or jury, and (3) under Tennessee law a life
sentence for habitual criminality prohibits consideration for parole.
The district court in the Goss case had disposed of the petition on
the basis of a 1912 United States Supreme Court decision 5 9 upholding
a habitual criminal statute against eighth amendment attack. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals pointed out that at the time of the 1912
decision there had been great doubt as to whether the eighth amend-
ment could be said to constitute a restriction on the individual states,
whereas in 1962 the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
prohibition applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.260
The court also emphasized that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment is to be enforced in relation to modern concepts of what
constitutes "cruelty" and what is "unusual,"26' quoting the Supreme
Court's statement that "The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."262 Stating its belief that the eighth amendment claims raised
by petitioner "merit consideration in an appropriate tribunal," the
court noted that the record did not show that these claims had ever
been submitted to the Tennessee Supreme Court.263 Because the
highest court of the state must pass on the constitutional issues
involved before the federal courts could do So,264 the court affirmed
the denial of the petition "solely" on the ground that petitioner
had not exhausted his state remedies.265 To say the least, the Goss
decision indicates an attitude that the Tennessee Habitual Criminal
Act could be applied so as to amount to "cruel and unusual punish-
ment' under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
E. Post-Trial Procedure
1. Right to Appellate Review, Right to Counsel.-The facts of
259. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
260. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
261. 337 F.2d at 342, citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
262. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
263. 337 F.2d at 343.
264. By virtue of the rule of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
265. 337 F.2d at 343.
266. 234 F. Supp. 882 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
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Tucker v. Meadows,266 decided during the survey period by the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
provides a lesson in how not to accord a criminal defendant his proce-
dural rights after trial. The petitioner for habeas corpus in that case
was convicted of armed robbery in a state court trial, during the
course of which as an indigent unable to employ counsel he had the
services of court-appointed counsel, and, because it was a capital case,
a court reporter was appointed at defense counsel's request to report
the trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the petitioner notified his
counsel that he wanted a motion for a new trial filed, and this was
conveyed by counsel to the trial judge. At the same time the defense
counsel moved the court for permission to withdraw from the case, and
the motion was granted immediately. The day following the convic-
tion, the trial judge approved an order removing the petitioner to the
state penitentiary which recited that the petitioner was "now being
held in the Sumner County jail pending the filing of a motion for a
new trial." After commitment to the penitentiary the petitioner
wrote the court-appointed attorney a number of times requesting him
to take steps to appeal the convictions, but his letters were un-
answered. Later he wrote this attorney requesting a trial transcript, to
which the attorney replied that if the petitioner could pay the court
reporter's regular fee he was sure a copy of the transcript could be
prepared for him. No steps were taken by either the attorney or the
trial judge to advise him as to the steps required to perfect an appeal.
In ruling in favor of the petitioner, the federal district court found
fault, not with state statutes concerning the procedural rights to
appeal of an indigent defendant in a capital case, but with failures to
observe the requirements of those statutes in the case before it. The
court noted that the code places the duty on the court-appointed re-
porter to prepare a copy of the proceedings of the trial "and turn the
same over to such counsel appointed for such defendant to be used
as his bill of exceptions."267 But the court reporter failed to prepare
and file the copy of the transcript of evidence, which would have
served as the bill of exceptions necessary to obtain full appellate
review. It was also noted that the code provides that the court-
appointed attorney "shall file such bill of exceptions in duplicate and
the clerk in preparing his transcript for the appellate court upon
appeal shall use the original bill of exceptions as part of such
transcript, retaining a copy in his files."2 8 But, with knowledge of
the petitioner's intention to file a motion for a new trial, the court-
appointed attorney requested and was granted permission to withdraw
267. TEN. CODE AN -. § 40-2011 (1956).
268. Id. § 40-2012.
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from the case. The court concluded that the statute was designed
to protect an indigent defendant, and to make certain that necessary
steps would be taken to perfect his appeal in a capital case, and to pro-
vide adequate representation by the court-appointed attorney in taking
those steps. The court also observed that "The statute is not con-
ditioned upon the request of the defendant nor upon his indication
of an intention to appeal" but is "mandatory in character and any
failure to observe its requirements necessarily constitutes a violation
of a defendant's rights in the class of cases to which it applies. 69
The court found that Tennessee's statutory procedure for protecting
the indigent defendant in connection with his right to appeal a capital
case was frustrated in this case by the action and non-action of state
officers and agencies. The court was particularly critical of the trial
court and the attorney below:
The court-appointed attorney had no right to withdraw from the case at this
critical stage of the proceeding and the court was without authority to
permit it. The default was only compounded after the withdrawal of the
court-appointed attorney by the failure of the court to take any steps to
appoint another attorney to represent the petitioner, although notice had been
given in open court that it was the petitioner's desire to file a motion for a
new trial. It had been definitely established in the proceeding that the peti-
tioner was an indigent defendant and the inference should have been clear
that he was ignorant of his rights and that without counsel a new trial
motion could not be prepared and filed.
From these established facts the Court can only find and conclude that the
petitioner was not only denied his statutory rights to have an appellate
review, but that he was also denied effective representation of counsel at a
critical stage in the proceeding in violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 70
The facts of the Tucker case are not believed to be typical. Rather,
it is believed that the trial courts, and the officers of these courts in-
cluding court-appointed attorneys, generally are aware of and attempt
to observe their statutory and constitutional obligations to the indigent
criminal defendant, even during the post-trial stage of perfecting the
procedural steps required to effectuate appellate review.
269. 234 F. Supp. at 884.
270. Id. at 885-86.
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